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a b s t r a c t
In this article, we attempt to formally study two very intuitive physical models: sealed
envelopes and locked boxes, often used as illustrations for common cryptographic
operations. We relax the security properties usually required from locked boxes [such as
in bit-commitment (BC) protocols] and require only that a broken lock or torn envelope
be identifiable to the original sender. Unlike the completely impregnable locked box, this
functionalitymaybe achievable in real life,where containers having this property are called
‘‘tamper-evident seals’’. Another physical objectwith this property is the ‘‘scratch-off card’’,
often used in lottery tickets. We consider three variations of tamper-evident seals, and
show that under some conditions they can be used to implement oblivious transfer, BC
and coin flipping (CF). We also show a separation between the three models. One of our
results is a strongly fair CF protocol with bias bounded by O(1/r) (where r is the number
of rounds); this was a stepping stone towards achieving such a protocol in the standard
model (in subsequent work).
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this article, we consider the use of ‘‘tamper-evident seals’’ in cryptographic protocols. A tamper-evident seal is a
primitive based on very intuitive physical models: the sealed envelope and the locked box. In the cryptographic and popular
literature, these are often used as illustrations for a number of basic cryptographic primitives. For instance, when Alice sends
an encrypted message to Bob, she is often depicted as placing the message in a locked box and sending the box to Bob (who
needs the key to read the message).
Bit commitment (BC), another well known primitive, is usually illustrated using a sealed envelope. In a BC protocol one
party, Alice, commits to a bit b to Bob in such a way that Bob cannot tell what b is. At a later time, Alice can reveal b, and
Bob can verify that this is indeed the bit to which she committed. The standard illustration used for a BC protocol is Alice
putting b in a sealed envelope, which she gives to Bob. Bob cannot see through the envelope (so cannot learn b). When Alice
reveals her bit, she lets Bob open the envelope so he can verify that she did not cheat.
The problem with the above illustration is that a physical ‘‘sealed envelope’’, used in the simple manner described, is
insufficient for BC: Bob can always tear open the envelope before Alice officially allows him to do so. Even a locked box is
unlikely to suffice; many protocols based on BC remain secure only if no adversary can ever open the box without a key. A
more modest security guarantee seems to be more easily obtained: an adversary may be able to tear open the envelope but
Alice will be able to recognize this when she sees the envelope again.
‘‘Real’’ closures with this property are commonly known as ‘‘tamper- evident seals’’. These are used widely from
containers for food and medicines to high-security government applications. Another common application that embodies
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these properties is the ‘‘scratch-off card’’, often used as a lottery ticket. This is usually a printed cardboard card which has
some areas coated by an opaque layer (e.g., the possible prizes to be won are covered). The text under the opaque coating
cannot be read without scratching off the coating, but it is immediately evident that this has been done (so the card issuer
can verify that only one possible prize has been uncovered).
In this article, we attempt to clarify what it means to use a sealed envelope or locked box in a cryptographic protocol.
Our focus is on constructing cryptographic protocols that use physical tamper-evident seals as their basis. In particular, we
study their applicability to coin flipping (CF), zero-knowledge protocols, BC and oblivious transfer (OT), some of the most
fundamental primitives in modern cryptography; OT is sufficient by itself for secure function evaluation [16,18] without
additional complexity assumptions. OT implies BC, which in turn implies zero-knowledge proofs for any language in NP [15]
and (weakly fair) CF [6].
Note that encryption is very simple to implement using tamper-evident containers (given authenticated channels),which
is why we do not discuss in depth in this article. For example, Alice and Bob can agree on a secret key by sending random
bits in sealed containers. A bit in a container that arrives unopened is guaranteed (by the tamper-evidence property) to be
completely unknown to the adversary. The case where only the creator of a container can tell whether it has been opened
requires only slightly more complex protocols.
1.1. Seals in different flavours
The intuitive definition of a tamper-evident seal does not specify its properties precisely. In this article, we consider
three variants of containers with tamper-evident seals. The differences arise from two properties: whether or not sealed
containers can be told apart and whether or not an honest player can break the seal.
Distinguishable vs. indistinguishable. One possibility is that containers can always be uniquely identified, even when sealed
(e.g., the containers have a serial number engraved on the outside). We call this a ‘‘distinguishable’’ model. A second
possibility is that containers can be distinguished only when open; all closed containers look alike, no matter who sealed
them (this is similar to the paper-envelope voting model, where the sealed envelopes cannot be told apart). We call this an
‘‘indistinguishable’’ model.
Weak lock vs. envelope. The second property can be likened to the difference between an envelope and a locked box: an
envelope is easy to open for anyone. A locked box, on the other hand, may be difficult for an ‘‘honest’’ player to openwithout
a key, although a dishonest player may know how to break the lock. We call the former an ‘‘envelope’’ model and the latter
a ‘‘weak lock’’ model. In Section 2, we give formal definitions for the different models.
Any envelopemodel is clearly stronger than the corresponding weak lockmodel (since in the envelopemodel the honest
player is more powerful, while the adversary remains the same).We show that there are protocols that can be implemented
in the indistinguishable models that cannot be realized in any of the distinguishable models. It is not clear, however, that
any indistinguishablemodel is strictly stronger than any distinguishablemodel. Although all four combinations are possible,
the indistinguishable envelope model does not appear significantly stronger than the indistinguishable weak lock (IDWL)
model, and in this article we discuss only the latter. Note that in the standard model of cryptography, where the parties
exchange messages and there is no access to outside physical resources, we do not know how to implement any of these
closures.
Additional variants. The definitions of tamper-evident seals we consider in this article are by no means the only possible
ones. They do, however, represent a fairly weak set of requirements for a physical implementation. In particular, we do not
require the containers to be unforgeable by their creator (this relaxation is captured by allowing the creator of the container
to change its contents and reseal it).
1.2. Our results
In this article, we show that tamper-evident seals can be used to implement standard cryptographic protocols. We
construct protocols for ‘‘weakly fair’’ CF (in which the result is 0, 1 or invalid), BC and OT using tamper-evident seals as
primitives.
A possibly practical application of our model is the ‘‘cryptographic randomized response technique’’ (CRRT), defined
by Ambainis et al. [2]. ‘‘Randomized response’’ is a polling technique used when some of the answers to the poll may be
stigmatizing (e.g., ‘‘do you use drugs?’’). The respondent lies with some known probability, allowing statistical analysis of
the results while letting the respondent disavow a stigmatizing response. In a CRRT, there is an additional requirement
that a malicious respondent cannot bias the results more than by choosing a different answer. The techniques described
by Ambainis et al. achieve this, but require ‘‘heavy’’ cryptographic machinery (such as OT), or quantum cryptography. In a
follow-up article [21], we show a simple protocol for CRRT using scratch-off cards.
One of the most interesting results is a protocol for ‘‘strongly fair’’ CF (where the result for an honest player must be
either 0 or 1 even if the other player quits before finishing the protocol) with bias bounded by O( 1r ), where r is the number
of rounds. This protocol was a stepping-stone to the subsequent construction of an optimal protocol for strongly fair CF in
the standard model [22].
T. Moran, M. Naor / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1283–1310 1285
Table 1
Comparison of tamper-evident seal models.
Model Possible Impossible
Bare CF, BC, OT
Dist. weak locks CF BC, OT
Dist. envelopes CF, BC, OT
Strongly fair CF(1/r)
Indist. weak locks CF, BC, ??
OT
An important contribution of this article is the formal analysis for the models and protocols we construct. We show that
the protocols areUniversally Composable (UC) in the sense of Canetti [7]. This allows us to use them securely as ‘‘black-boxes’’
in larger constructions.
On the negative side, we show that our protocol for strongly fair CF using sealed envelopes is optimal: it is impossible
to do better than O( 1r ) bias (this follows from a careful reading of the proof in [8]). We also give impossibility results for
BC and OT (note that we show the impossibility of any type of BC or OT, not just UC realizations). The proofs are based
on information-theoretic methods: loosely speaking, we show that the sender has too much information about what the
receiver knows. When this is the case, BC is impossible because the sender can decide in advance what the receiver will
accept (so either the receiver knows the committed bit or it is possible to equivocate), while OT is impossible because the
transfer cannot be ‘‘oblivious’’ (the sender knows how much information the receiver has on each of his bits).
Our results show a separation between the different models of tamper-evident seals and the ‘‘bare’’ model, summarized
in Table 1:
1.3. Related work
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt at using tamper-evident seals for cryptographic protocols. Ross
Anderson discusses ‘‘packaging and seals’’ in the context of security engineering [3], however the use of tamper-evidence
does not extend to more complex protocols. Blaze gives some examples of the reverse side of the problem: cryptanalysis of
physical security systems using techniques from computer science [4,5]. Using scratch-off cards in the lottery setting can
be described as a very weak form of CF, however, we do not believe this has ever been formally analyzed (or used in more
complex protocols).
On the other hand, basing cryptographic protocols on physical models is a common practice. Perhaps, the most
striking example is the field of quantum cryptography, where the physics of quantum mechanics are used to implement
cryptographic operations — some of which are impossible in the ‘‘bare’’ model. One of the inspirations for this work was the
idea of ‘‘QuantumBit Escrow’’ (QBE) [1], a primitive that is very similar to a tamper-evident seal and that can be implemented
in a quantum setting. There are, however, significant differences between our definitions of tamper-evident seals and QBE.
In particular, in QBE the adversary may ‘‘entangle’’ separate escrowed bits and ‘‘partially open’’ commitments. Thus, while
unconditionally secure BC is impossible in the pure quantum setting [20,19], it is possible in ours.
Muchwork has been done on basing BC and OT on the physical properties of communication channels, using the random
noise in a communication channel as the basis for security. Both BC and OT were shown to be realizable in the Binary
Symmetric Channel model [10,9], in which random noise is added to the channel in both directions with some known,
constant, probability. Later work shows that they can also be implemented, under certain conditions, in the weaker (but
more convincing)Unfair Noisy Channelmodel [12,11], where the error probability is not known exactly to the honest parties,
and furthermore can be influenced by the adversary. Our construction for 1–2 OT uses some of the techniques and results
from [12].
One of the motivations for this work was the attempt to construct cryptographic protocols that are implementable by
humans without the aid of computers. This property is useful, for example, in situations where computers cannot be trusted
to be running the protocol they claim, or where ‘‘transparency’’ to humans is a requirement (such as in voting protocols).
Many other examples exist of using simple physical objects as a basis for cryptographic protocols that can be performed by
humans, some are even folklore: Sarah Flannery [14] recounts a childhood riddle that uses a doubly locked box to transfer
a diamond between two parties, overcoming the corrupt postal system (which opens any unlocked boxes) despite the fact
that the two parties have never met (and can only communicate through the mail). Fagin, Naor andWinkler [13] assembled
a number of solutions to the problem of comparing secret information without revealing anything but the result of the
comparison using a variety of different physical methods. Schneier devised a cipher [24] that can be implemented by a
human using a pack of cards. In a lighter vein, Naor, Naor and Reingold [23] give a protocol that provides a ‘‘zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge’’ of the correct answer to the children’s puzzle ‘‘Where’s Waldo’’ using only a large newspaper and
scissors. A common thread in these works is that they lack a formal specification of the model they use, and a formal proof
of security.
1.4. Organization of the article
In Section 2, we give formal definitions for the different models of tamper-evident seals and the functionalities we
attempt to realize using them. In Section 3, we discuss the capabilities of the distinguishable weak lock (DWL) model, show
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that BC is impossible in this model and give a protocol for weakly fair CF. In Section 4, we discuss the capabilities of the
distinguishable envelope (DE) model, showing that OT is impossible and giving protocols for BC and strongly fair CF with
bias 1/r . Section 5 contains a discussion of the indistinguishable weak lock model and a protocol for OT in this model. The
proofs of security for the protocols we describe are given in Sections 6, 8.1, 7, 9 and 10. The proofs are fairly technical, and
can be skipped on first reading. Section 11 contains the discussion and some open problems.
2. Model: Ideal functionalities
2.1. Ideal functionalities and the UC framework
Many two-party functionalities are easy to implement using a trusted third party that follows pre-agreed rules. In proving
that a two-party protocol is secure, we often want to say that it behaves ‘‘as if it were performed using the trusted third
party’’. A formalization of this idea is the UC model defined by Canetti [7].
In the UC model, the trusted third party is called the ideal functionality. The ideal functionality is described by a program
(formally, it is an interactive Turingmachine) that can communicate by authenticated, private channelswith the participants
of the protocol.
The notion of security in the UC model is based on simulation: a protocol securely realizes an ideal functionality in the
UC model if any attack on the protocol in the ‘‘real’’ world, where no trusted third party exists, can be performed against
the ideal functionality with the same results. Attacks in the ideal world are carried out by an ‘‘ideal adversary’’, that can also
communicate privately with the functionality. The ideal adversary can corrupt honest parties by sending a special Corrupt
command to the functionality, at which point the adversary assumes full control of the corrupted party. This allows the
functionality to act differently depending on which of the parties are corrupted. Additional capabilities of the adversary are
explicitly defined by the ideal functionality.
Proving protocol security in the UC model provides two main benefits: First, the functionality definition is an intuitive
way to describe the desired properties of a protocol. Second (and the original motivation for the definition of the UCmodel),
protocols that are secure in the UC have very strong security properties, such as security under composition and security
that is retained when the protocol is used as a sub-protocol to replace an ideal functionality. This security guarantee allows
us to simplify many of our proofs, by showing separately the security of their component sub-protocols.
Note that our impossibility results are not specific to the UC model: the impossibility results for BC (Section 3.3), OT
(Section 4.1) and the lower bound for strongly fair CF (Section 4.4) hold even for the weaker ‘‘standard’’ notions of these
functionalities.
In this section, we formally define the different models for tamper-evident seals in terms of their ideal functionalities.
For completeness, we also give the definitions of the primitives we are trying to implement (CF, BC and OT). We restrict
ourselves to the two-party case, and to adversaries that decide at the beginning of the protocol whether to corrupt one of
the parties or neither.
For readability, wemake a few compromises in strict formality when describing the functionalities. First, the description
is in natural language rather than pseudocode. Second, we implicitly assume the following for all the descriptions:
• All functionalities (unless explicitly specified) have a Halt command that can be given by the adversary at any time.
When a functionality receives this command, it outputs ⊥ to all parties. The functionality then halts (ignoring further
commands). In a two party protocol, this is equivalent to a party halting prematurely.
• When a functionality receives an invalid command (one that does not exist or is improperly formatted), it proceeds as if
it received the Halt command.
• When we say that the functionality ‘‘verifies’’ some condition, we mean that if the condition does not hold, the function-
ality proceeds as if it received the Halt command.
2.2. Tamper-evident seals
These are the functionalities on which we base the protocols we describe in the article. In the succeeding sections, we
assume we are given one of these functionalities and attempt to construct a protocol for a ‘‘target’’ functionality (these are
described in Section 2.3).
2.2.1. Distinguishable weak locks
This functionality models a tamper-evident container that has a ‘‘weak lock’’: an honest party requires a key to open the
container, but the adversary can break the lock without help. Functionality F (DWL) contains an internal table that consists
of tuples of the form (id, value, creator, holder, state). The table represents the state and location of the tamper-evident
containers. It contains one entry for each existing container, indexed by the container’s id and creator. We denote valueid,
creatorid, holderid and stateid the corresponding values in the table in row id (assuming the row exists). The table is initially
empty. The functionality is described as follows, running with parties P1, . . . , Pn and ideal adversary I:
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Seal (id, value) This command creates and seals a container. On receiving this command from party Pi, the functionality
verifies that id has the form (Pi, {0, 1}∗) (this form of id is a technical detail to ensure that ids are local to each party).
If this is the first Seal message with id id, the functionality stores the tuple (id, value, Pi, Pi, sealed) in the table. If this
is not the first Seal with id id, it verifies that creatorid = holderid = Pi and, if so, replaces the entry in the table with
(id, value, Pi, Pi, sealed).
Send (id, Pj) On receiving this command from party Pi, the functionality verifies that an entry for container id appears in the
table and that holderid = Pi. If so, it outputs
(
Receipt, id, creatorid, Pi, Pj
)
to Pj and I and replaces the entry in the table
with
(
id, valueid, creatorid, Pj, stateid
)
.
Open id On receiving this command from Pi, the functionality verifies that an entry for container id appears in the table,
that holderid = Pi and that either Pi is corrupted or stateid = unlocked. It then sends (Opened, id, valueid, creatorid) to Pi.
If stateid 6= unlocked it replaces the entry in the table with (id, valueid, creatorid, holderid, broken).
Verify id On receiving this command from Pi, the functionality verifies that an entry for container id appears in the table and
that holderid = Pi. It then considers stateid. If stateid = broken it sends (Verified, id, broken) to Pi. Otherwise, it sends
(Verified, id, ok) to Pi.
Unlock id On receiving this command from Pi, the functionality verifies that an entry for container id appears in the
table, that creatorid = Pi and that stateid = sealed. If so, it replaces the entry in the table with (id, valueid, creatorid,
holderid,unlocked) and sends (Unlocked, id) to holderid.
2.2.2. Distinguishable envelopes
Functionality F (DE) models a tamper-evident ‘‘envelope’’: in this case, honest parties can open the envelope without
need for a key (although the opening will be evident to the envelope’s creator if the envelope is returned). This functionality
is almost exactly identical to F (DWL), except the Open command allows anyone holding the container to open it. The
functionality description is identical to F (DWL), except that the new handling of the Open command is:
Open id On receiving this command from Pi, the functionality verifies that an entry for container id appears in the ta-
ble and that holderid = Pi. It sends (Opened, id, valueid, creatorid) to Pi. It also replaces the entry in the table with
(id, valueid, creatorid, holderid, broken).
TheUnlock command is now irrelevant, but still supported tomake it clear that thismodel is strictly stronger than theweak
lock model.
2.2.3. Indistinguishable weak locks
This functionality models tamper-evident containers with ‘‘weak locks’’ that are indistinguishable from the outside. The
indistinguishability is captured by allowing the players to shuffle the containers in their possession using an additional
Exchange command. To capture the fact that the indistinguishability applies only to sealed containers, the internal table
contains an addition column: sid, the ‘‘sealed id’’. This is a unique id that is shuffled along with the rest of the container
contents and is revealed when the container is opened.2
Functionality F (IWL) can be described as follows, running with parties P1, . . . , Pn and adversary I:
Seal (id, sid, value) This command creates and seals a container. On receiving this command from party Pi, the functionality
verifies that id and sid have the form (Pi, {0, 1}∗).
Case 1: This is the first Seal message with id id and sid sid. In this case, the functionality stores the tuple (id, sid,
value, Pi, Pi, sealed) in the table.
Case 2: This is the first Seal message with sid sid but id has been used before. In this case, the functionality verifies that
holderid = Pi. It then replaces the entry in the table with (id, sid, value, Pi, Pi, sealed).
Case 3: This is the first Sealmessage with id id but sid has been used before. In this case, the functionality proceeds as if it has
received the Halt command.
Send (id, Pj) On receiving this command from party Pi, the functionality verifies that an entry for container id appears in
the table and that holderid = Pi. If so, it sends
(
Receipt, id, Pi, Pj
)
to Pj and I and replaces the entry in the table with(
id, sidid, valueid, creatorid, Pj, stateid
)
.
Open id On receiving this command from Pi, the functionality verifies that an entry for container id appears in the table,
that holderid = Pi and that either Pi is corrupted or stateid = unlocked. It then sends (Opened, id, sidid, valueid, creatorid)
to Pi. If stateid 6= unlocked it replaces the entry in the table with (id, sidid, valueid, creatorid, ownerid, broken).
Verify id On receiving this command from Pi, the functionality verifies that an entry for container id appears in the table and
that holderid = Pi. It then considers stateid. If stateid = broken it sends (Verified, id, broken) to Pi. Otherwise, it sends
(Verified, id, ok) to Pi.
2 Technically, the sid can be used to encodemore than a single bit in a container.We do notmake use of this property in any of our protocols, but changing
the definition to eliminate it would make it unduly cumbersome.
1288 T. Moran, M. Naor / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1283–1310
Unlock sid On receiving this command from Pi, the functionality verifies that an entry exists in the table forwhich sidid = sid,
that creatorid = Pi. If stateid = sealed, it replaces the entry in the tablewith (id, sidid, valueid, creatorid, holderid,unlocked).
Otherwise, it does nothing. Note that this command does not send any messages (so it cannot be used to determine who
is holding a container).
Exchange (id1, id2) On receiving this command from Pi the functionality verifies that both id1 and id2 exist in the table, and
that holderid1 = holderid2 = Pi. It then exchanges the two table rows; the tuples in the table are replaced with (id2, sidid1 ,
valueid1 , creatorid1 , Pi, stateid1) and (id1, sidid2 , valueid2 , creatorid2 , Pi, stateid2).
A note about notation. In the interests of readability, we will often refer to parties ‘‘preparing’’ a container or envelope
instead of specifying that they send a Sealmessage to the appropriate functionality. Likewise, we say a party ‘‘verifies that
a container is sealed’’ when the party sends a Verify message to the functionality, waits for the response and checks that
the resulting Verifiedmessage specifies an ok status. We say a party ‘‘opens a container’’ when it sends an Openmessage
to the functionality and waits for the Opened response. We say the party ‘‘shuffles’’ a set of containers according to some
permutation (in the indistinguishable model) when it uses the appropriate Exchange messages to apply the permutation
to the containers’ ids.
2.3. Target functionalities
These are the ‘‘standard’’ functionalities we attempt to implement using the tamper-evident seals.
2.3.1. Weakly fair coin flipping
This functionality models CF in which the result of the coin flip can be 0, 1 or ⊥. The result of the flip c should satisfy:
Pr[c = 0] ≤ 12 and Pr[c = 1] ≤ 12 . This is usually what is meant when talking about ‘‘CF’’ (for instance, in Blum’s ‘‘Coin
FlippingOver the Telephone’’ protocol [6]). The⊥ result corresponds to the casewhere one of the parties noticeably deviated
from (or prematurely aborted) the protocol. Under standard cryptographic assumptions (such as the existence of one-way
functions), weakly fair CF is possible. Conversely, in the standard model the existence of weakly fair CF implies one-way
functions [17].
Functionality F (WCF) is described as follows, with parties Alice and Bob and adversary I:
Value The sender of this command is Alice (the other party is Bob). When this command is received, the functionality
chooses a uniform value d ∈ {0, 1}. If one of the parties is corrupted, the functionality outputs (Approve, d) to I
(the adversary). In that case, the functionality ignores all inputs until it receives either a Continue command or a Halt
command from I. If no party is corrupted, the functionality proceeds as if I had sent a Continue command.
Halt When this command is received from I (in response to an Approve message) the functionality outputs ⊥ to all
parties and halts.
Continue When this command is received from I (in response to an Approvemessage), the functionality outputs (Coin, d)
to all parties and halts.
Note: if only one of the parties can cheat in the coin flip, we say the coin flip has one-sided error.
2.3.2. Strongly fair coin flipping with bias p
This functionality (adapted from [7]) models a coin flip between two parties with a bounded bias. If both parties follow
the protocol, they output an identical uniformly chosen bit. Even if one party does not follow the protocol, the other party
outputs a random bit d that satisfies: | Pr[d = 0] − Pr[d = 1]| ≤ 2p. Note that we explicitly deal with premature halting;
the standard Halt command is not present in this functionality.
Functionality F (SCF) is described as follows:
Value When this command is received for the first time from any party, F (SCF) chooses a bit b, such that b = 1 with
probability p and 0 with probability 1 − p (this bit signifies whether it will allow the adversary to set the result). If
b = 1, the functionality sends the message ChooseValue to I. Otherwise, it chooses a random bit d ∈ {0, 1} and outputs
(Coin, d) to all parties and to I. If this command is sent more than once, all invocations but the first are ignored.
Bias d When this command is received, the functionality verifies that the sender is corrupt, that the Value command was
previously sent by one of the parties and that b = 1 (if any of these conditions are not met, the command is ignored).
The functionality then outputs (Coin, d) to all parties.
2.3.3. Bit commitment
Functionality F (BC) (adapted from [7]) can be described as follows:
Commit b The issuer of this command is called the sender, the other party is the receiver. On receiving this command, the
functionality records b and outputs Committed to the receiver. It then ignores any other commands until it receives the
Open command from the sender.
Open On receiving this command from the sender, the functionality outputs (Opened, b) to the receiver.
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2.3.4. Oblivious transfer
Functionality F (OT ) (taken from [11]) is as follows:
Send (b0, b1) The issuer of this command is called the sender, the other party is the receiver. On receiving this command,
the functionality records (b0, b1) and outputs QueryChoice to the receiver. It then ignores all other commands until it
receives a Choice command from the receiver.
Choice c On receiving this command from the receiver, the functionality verifies that c ∈ {0, 1}. It then sends bc to the
receiver.
2.4. Intermediate functionalities
In order to simplify the presentation, in the following sections we will present protocols that realize functionalities that
are slightly weaker than the ones we want. We then use standard amplification techniques to construct the ‘‘full’’ func-
tionalities from their weak version. In this section, we define these intermediate functionalities and state the amplification
lemmas we use to construct the stronger versions of these primitives. These definitions are in the spirit of [12].
2.4.1. p-weak bit-commitment
This functionality models BC, where a corrupt receiver can cheat with probability p. Note that an -WBC protocol is a
regular BC protocol when  is negligible. Formally, functionality F (p−WBC) proceeds as follows:
Commit b The issuer of this command is called the sender, the other party is the receiver. On receiving this command, the
functionality records b and outputs Committed to the receiver. It ignores any additional Commit commands.
Open b On receiving this command from the sender, the functionality verifies that the sender previously sent a Commit b
command. If so, the functionality outputs (Opened, b) to the receiver.
Break On receiving this command from a corrupt receiver, the functionality verifies that the sender previously sent a
Commit b command. With probability p it sends (Broken, b) to the receiver and with probability 1− p it sends⊥ to the
receiver. Additional Break commands are ignored.
The following theorem allows us to amplify any p-WBC protocol when p < 1, meaning that the existence of such a
protocol implies the existence of regular BC.






instances of F (p−WBC).
The proof for this theorem is given in Section 9.3.
2.4.2. p-remotely inspectable seal
This functionality is used in our protocol for strongly fair CF. It is a strengthened version of a tamper-evident seal. With
a tamper-evident seal, only its holder can interact with it. Thus, either the sender can check if it was opened, or the receiver
can verify that the sealed contents were not changed, but not both at the same time. A remotely inspectable seal (RIS) is one
that can be tested ‘‘remotely’’ (without returning it to the sender). Unfortunately, we cannot realize this ‘‘perfect’’ version in
the DE model, therefore, relax it somewhat: we allow a corrupt receiver to learn the committed bit during the verification
process and only then decide (assuming he did not previously break the seal) whether or not the verification should succeed.
Our definition is actually a further relaxation3: the receiver may cheat with some probability: A corrupt receiver who opens
the commitment before the verify stage will be caught with probability 1− p.
Formally, the functionality maintains an internal state variable v = (vb, vs) consisting of the committed bit vb and a
‘‘seal’’ flag vs. It accepts the commands:
Commit b The issuer of this command is called the sender, the other party is the receiver. b can be either 0, 1. The
functionality sets v ← (b, sealed). The functionality outputs Committed to the receiver and ignores any subsequent
Commit commands.
Open This command is sent by the receiver. The functionality outputs (Opened, vb) to the receiver. If vs = sealed, with
probability 1− p the functionality sets vs ← open.
Verify If vs 6= sealed, the functionality outputs (Verifying,⊥) to the receiver and⊥ to the sender. Otherwise (no opening
was detected), the functionality outputs (Verifying, vb) to the receiver. If the receiver is corrupt, the functionality waits
for a response. If the adversary responds with ok, the functionality outputs Sealed to the sender, otherwise it outputs⊥
to the sender. If the receiver is not corrupt, the functionality behaves as if the adversary had responded with ok. After
receiving this command from the sender (and responding appropriately), the functionality ignores any subsequentVerify
and Open commands.
We call 0-RIS simply ‘‘RIS’’. When is negligible, -RIS is statistically indistinguishable from RIS. The following theorem
states that a p-RIS functionality can be amplified for any p < 1 to get RIS:






instances of F (p−RIS).
The proof for this theorem appears in Section 8.2.
3 This second relaxation is only for convenience; we can remove it using amplification as noted in Theorem 2.2.
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2.4.3. Possibly cheating weak oblivious transfer
The ideal functionality for WOT is defined in [12]. Loosely, a (p, q)-WOT protocol is a 1-2 OT protocol in which a corrupt
sender gains extra information and can learn the receiver’s bit with probability at most p, while a corrupt receiver gains
information that allows it to learn the sender’s bit with probability at most q. Here, we define a very similar functionality,
(p, q)-Possibly Cheating Weak Oblivious Transfer.
This functionality differs from WOT in two ways: First, a corrupt sender or receiver learns whether or not cheating will
be successful before committing to their bits. Second, a corrupt sender that cheats successfully is not committed to her bits
— the sender can choose which bit the receiver will receive as a function of the receiver’s bit.
Formally, functionality F (p,q−PCWOT ) proceeds as follows:
CanCheat When this command is first received, the functionality chooses a uniformly randomnumber x ∈ [0, 1] and records
this number. x is returned to the issuer of the command and further CanCheat commands are ignored. This command
can only be sent by a corrupt party.
Send (b0, b1) The issuer of this command is called the sender, the other party is the receiver. On receiving this command,
the functionality records (b0, b1) and outputs QueryChoice to the receiver. If the receiver is corrupt and x < q it also
outputs (Broken, b0, b1) to the receiver. It then ignores all other commands until it receives a Choice command from
the receiver.
Choice c On receiving this command from the receiver, the functionality verifies that c ∈ {0, 1}. If the sender is corrupt and
x < p, it sends (Broken, c) to the sender and waits for a Resend command. Otherwise, it sends bc to the receiver. Any
further Choice commands are ignored.
Resend b On receiving this command from a corrupt sender, and if x < p, the functionality sends b to the receiver.
In [12], Damgård et al. prove that (p, q)-WOT implies OT iff p+ q < 1. A careful reading of their proof shows that this is
also the case for (p, q)-PCWOT, giving the following result:




of F (p,q−PCWOT ).
2.5. Proofs in the UC model
Formally, the UC model defines two ‘‘worlds’’, which should be indistinguishable to an outside observer called the
‘‘environment machine’’ (denoted Z).
The ‘‘ideal world’’ contains two ‘‘dummy’’ parties, the ‘‘target’’ ideal functionality, Z and an ‘‘ideal adversary’’, I. The
parties in this world are ‘‘dummy’’ parties because they pass any input they receive directly to the target ideal functionality,
and write anything received from the ideal functionality to their local output. I can communicate with Z and the ideal
functionality, and can corrupt one of the parties. I sees the input and any communication sent to the corrupted party, and
can control the output of that party. The environment machine, Z, can set the inputs to the parties and read their local
outputs, but cannot see the communication with the ideal functionality.
The ‘‘real world’’ contains two ‘‘real’’ parties, Z and a ‘‘real adversary’’,A. In addition, it may contain the ‘‘service’’ ideal
functionalities (in our case, the DE functionality).A can communicate withZ and the ‘‘service’’ ideal functionalities, and can
corrupt one of the parties. The uncorrupted parties follow the protocol, while corrupted parties are completely controlled
byA. As in the ideal world,Z can set the inputs for the parties and see their outputs, but not internal communication (other
than what is known to the adversary).
The protocol securely realizes an ideal functionality in the UCmodel, if there exists I such that for anyZ andA,Z cannot
distinguish between the ideal world and the real world. Our proofs of security follow the general outline for a proof typical
of the UC model: we describe the ideal adversary, I, that ‘‘lives’’ in the ideal world. Internally, I simulates the execution of
the ‘‘real’’ adversary, A. We can assume w.l.o.g. that A is simply a proxy for Z, sending any commands received from the
environment to the appropriate party and relaying any communication from the parties back to the environment machine.
I simulates the ‘‘real world’’ for A, in such a way that Z cannot distinguish between the ideal world when it is talking to
I and the real world. In our case, we will show that Z’s view of the execution is not only indistinguishable, but actually
identical in both cases.
All the ideal adversaries used in our proofs have, roughly, the same idea. They contain a ‘‘black-box’’ simulation of
the real adversary, intercepting its communication with the tamper-evident container functionalities and replacing it
with a simulated interaction with simulated tamper-evident containers. The main problem in simulating a session that is
indistinguishable from the real world is that the ideal adversary does not have access to honest parties’ inputs, and so cannot
just simulate the honest parties. Instead, the ideal adversarymakes use of the fact that in the idealworld the ‘‘tamper-evident
seals’’ are simulated, giving it two tools that are not available in the real world:
First, the ideal adversary does not need to commit in advance to the contents of containers (it can decide what the
contents are at the time they are opened), since, in the real world, the contents of a container do not affect the view until
the moment it is opened.
Second, the ideal adversary knows exactly what the real adversary is doing with the simulated containers at the time the
real adversary performs the action, since any commands sent by the real adversary to the simulated tamper-evident container
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functionality are actually received by the ideal adversary. Thismeans that the ideal adversary knowswhen the real adversary
is cheating. The target functionalities, when they allow cheating, fail completely if successful cheating gives the corrupt party
‘‘illegal’’ information: in case cheating is successful, they give the adversary the entire input of the honest party. Thus, the
strategy used by the ideal adversary is to attempt to cheat (by sending a command to the target ideal functionality) when
it detects the real adversary cheating. If it succeeds, it can simulate the rest of the protocol identically to a real honest party
(since it now has all the information it needs). If it fails to cheat, the ideal adversary uses its ‘‘inside’’ information to cause
the real adversary to be ‘‘caught’’ in the simulation.
3. Capabilities of the distinguishable weak lock model
This is the weakest of the four primitives we consider. We show that unconditionally secure BC and OT are impossible in
this model. However, this model is still strictly stronger than the bare model, as weak CF is possible in this model.
3.1. A weakly fair coin flipping protocol
We give a protocol that securely realizes F (WCF) using calls to F (DWL). Here, Alice learns the result of the coin flip first.
Note that when this protocol is implemented in the DE Model, a trivial change allows it to have one-sided error (only Bob
can cheat). In this case, Bob learns the result of the coin flip first.
Protocol 3.1 (WCF).
1. Alice prepares and sends to Bob 4n containers arranged in quads. Each quad contains two containers with the value 0
and two with the value 1. The order of the 0s and 1s within the quad is random.
2. If Alice halts before completing the previous stage, Bob outputs a random bit and halts. Otherwise, Bob chooses one
container from every quad and sends the chosen containers to Alice.
3. Alice verifies that all the containers Bob sent are still sealed (if not, or if Bob halts before sending all the containers, she
outputs ⊥ and halts). She then unlocks all the remaining containers, outputs the xor of the bits in the containers she
received from Bob and halts.
4. Bob opens all the containers in his possession. If any triplet of open containers is improper ((0, 0, 0) or (1, 1, 1)), Bob
outputs a random bit and halts. If Alice quits before unlocking the containers, Bob outputs ⊥ and halts. Otherwise, he
outputs the xor of the bits in the containers that remain in his possession and halts. In the DE model, Bob can open the
containers without help from Alice, so he never outputs⊥.
The following theorem (whose proof appears in Section 6) states the security properties for the protocol:
Theorem 3.1. Protocol 3.1 securely realizes F (WCF) in the UC model.
3.2. Oblivious transfer is impossible
Any protocol in the DWL model is also a protocol in the DE model (see Section 4). We show in Section 4.1 that OT is
impossible in the DE model, hence it must also be impossible in the DWL model.
3.3. Bit-commitment is impossible
To showBC is impossible in theDWLmodel,wedefine a small set of properties that every BCprotocolmust satisfy in order
to be considered ‘‘secure’’. We then show that no protocol in the DWL model can satisfy these properties simultaneously.
A BC protocol is a protocol between two players, a sender and a receiver. Formally, we can describe the protocol using
four PPTs, corresponding to the commitment stage and the opening stage for each party.
PSCommit(b, 1
n) receives an input bit and plays the sender’s part in the commit stage of the protocol. The PPT can communicate
with PRCommit and with the F
(DWL) functionality. It also has an output tape whose contents are passed to PSOpen.
PRCommit(1
n) plays the receiver’s part in the commit stage of the protocol. It can communicate with PSCommit and with the
F (DWL) functionality. It also has an output tape whose contents are passed to PROpen.
PSOpen(1
n) receives the output tape of PSCommit, and can communicate with P
R
Open and with the F
(DWL) functionality (note that
F (DWL) retains its state between the commit and open stage).
PROpen(1
n) receives the output tape of PRCommit, and can communicate with P
R
Open and with the F
(DWL) functionality. PROpen(1
n)
outputs either a bit b′ or⊥.
A BC protocol is complete, if it satisfies:
Definition 3.2 (Completeness). If b is the input to PSCommit, and both parties follow the protocol, the probability that the
output of PROpen(1
n) is not b is a neglible function in n.
1292 T. Moran, M. Naor / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1283–1310
We say a BC protocol is secure, if it satisfies the following two properties:
Definition 3.3 (Hiding). Let the sender’s input b be chosen uniformly at random. Then, for any adversary B substituted for
PRCommit in the protocol, the probability that B can guess b is at most
1
2 + (n), where  is a negligible function.
Definition 3.4 (Binding). For any adversary A = (ACommit, AOpen(x)) substituted for PS in the protocol, if x ∈ {0, 1} is chosen
independently and uniformly at random after the end of the commit stage, the probability (over A and PR’s random coins
and over x) that PROpen outputs x is at most
1
2 + (n), where  is a negligible function.
Implementing BC that is secure against computationally unbounded players using only the F (DWL) functionality is
impossible. We show this is the case not only for UC BC (which is a very strong notion of BC), but even for a fairly weak
version: there is no BC protocol that is both unconditionally hiding and unconditionally binding in the DWL model.
Intuitively, the reason that BC is impossible is that in the DWL model the sender has access to all the information
the receiver has about the sender’s bit. This information cannot completely specify the bit (since in that case the hiding
requirement of the commitment protocol is not satisfied), hence there must be valid decommitments for both 0 and
1 (that the receiver will accept). Since the sender knows what information the receiver has, she can determine which
decommitments will be accepted (contradicting the binding requirement).
More formally, the proof proceeds in three stages. First, we show that we can assume w.l.o.g. that a BC protocol in the
DWL model ends the commit phase with all containers returned to their creators. Second, we show that if the receiver is
honest, the sender can compute everything the receiver knows about her bit and her random string.We then combine these
facts to show that either the receiver knows her bit (hence the protocol is not hiding) or the sender can decommit to two
different values (hence the protocol is not binding).
Let P = (PSCommit, PSOpen, PRCommit, PROpen) be a BC protocol using calls to F (DWL), where PS denotes the sender’s side of the
protocol and PR the receiver’s side. Let Alice be the sender in the commitment protocol and Bob the receiver. Denote Alice’s
input bit by b and her random string by rA. Denote Bob’s random string rB and Bob’s view of the protocol at the end of the
commit stage VBob (w.l.o.g, this is assumed to be the output of PRCommit). We can assumew.l.o.g. that both parties knowwhich
is the final message of the commit stage (since both parties must agree at some point that the commit stage is over).
Let P ′ the protocol in which, at the end of the commit stage, Alice unlocks all the containers she created and Bob opens
all the containers in his possession, records their contents and returns them to Alice. Formally, the protocol is defined as
follows:
• P ′RCommit runs PRCommit using the same input and random coins, keeping track of the locations of all containers created by the
sender. When PRCommit terminates, P
′R
Commit waits for all containers it holds to be unlocked, then opens all of them, records
their contents and returns them to P ′S .
• P ′SCommit runs PSCommit using the same input and random coins, keeping track of the locations of all containers it creates.
When PSCommit terminates, P
′S
Commit unlocks all the containers created by P
S and still held by the receiver, then waits for the
containers to be returned.
• P ′SOpen runs PSOpen, but when PSOpen sends an Unlock command to F (DWL) for a container that was created by P ′SCommit, P ′SOpen
instead sends a special ‘‘unlock’’ message to P ′ROpen.
• P ′ROpen runs PROpen, converting the special ‘‘unlock’’ messages sent by P ′SOpen to simulatedUnlockedmessages fromF (DWL). It
also intercepts requests to open containers that were created by P ′SCommit and simulates the responses using the recorded
contents. Its output is the output of PROpen.
Lemma 3.5. If P is both hiding and binding, so is P ′.
Proof. P ′ is binding. If P ′ is not binding, it means there is some adversary A′ = (A′Commit, A′Open(x)) such that when A′ is
substituted for P ′S , P ′R will output xwith probability at least 12 + poly( 1n ).
We can construct an adversary A that will have the same probability of success when substituted for PS in protocol
P: ACommit runs A′Commit until P
R
Commit terminates, recording the contents and locations of any containers A
′ creates. It then
continues to run A′Commit, discarding any Unlock commands A′ sends after this point, and simulating the receipt of all
containers created by A′ and still held by PR (if A′ asks to verify a container, A simulates an ok response from F (DWL), and if
it asks to open a container, A simulates the correct Opened response using the recorded contents).
AOpen(x) runs A′Open(x). When A
′
Open(x) sends a special unlockmessage to P
R, AOpen(x) sends the corresponding real unlock
command to F (DWL). Given the same input and random coins, the simulated version of PROpen under P
′ has a view identical
to the real PROpen under P , hence the output must be the same. Therefore, the probability that A is successful is identical to
the probability that A′ is successful. This contradicts the hypothesis that P is binding.
P ′ is hiding. If P ′ is not hiding, there is some adversary B′ = B′Commit that, substituted for P ′RCommit in protocol P ′ can guess b
with probability 12 +poly( 1n ). We can construct an adversary B for the protocol P as follows: B behaves identically to B′ until
PSCommit terminates. It then breaks all the containers that remain in its possession and continues running B
′, simulating the
Unlockmessages from PS . Since the simulation of B′ under B and the real B′ in protocol P ′ see an identical view (given the
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same random coins and input), B and B′ will have the same output, guessing b successfully with non-negligible advantage.
This contradicts the hypothesis that P is hiding. 
Denote P ′′ the protocol in which, at the end of PCommit, Alice returns all of Bob’s containers to him and Bob uses them only
in P ′′Open (or ignores them if they are never used).
Formally, P ′′SCommit runs P
S
Commit until it terminates, keeping track of the containers created by P
′′R. It then returns all those
containers that it still holds to P ′′R. P ′′RCommit runs P
R
Commit until it terminates, and records the ids of the containers received
from P ′′SCommit.
P ′′SOpen runs P
S
Open, replacing Send commands to F
(DWL) for containers sent by P ′′S with special ‘‘send’’ messages to P ′′R.
When PSOpen attempts to open one of the containers sent by P
′′S , P ′′S sends a special ‘‘return’’ message to P ′′R and waits for it
to send that container.
P ′′ROpen runs P
R
Open, intercepting the special ‘‘send’’ and ‘‘return’’ messages from P
′′S . In response to a ‘‘send’’ message it
simulates a Receiptmessage fromF (DWL), and in response to a ‘‘return’’ message it gives the corresponding Send command
to F (DWL).
Lemma 3.6. If P is both hiding and binding then so is P ′′.
Proof. P ′′ is binding. Suppose P ′′ is not. Then, there exists some adversary A′′ = (A′′Commit, A′′Open(x)) such that when A′′ is
substituted for P ′′S , P ′′R will output xwith probability at least 12 + poly( 1n ).
We can construct an adversary A that will have the same probability of success when substituted for PS in protocol P:
ACommit runs A′′Commit until P
R
Commit terminates. It then continues to run A
′′
Commit, intercepting any Send commands A
′′ sends
after this point.
AOpen(x) runs A′′Open(x). When A
′′
Open(x) sends a special ‘‘send’’ message to P
′′R, AOpen(x) instead sends the corresponding
real container to PR. When A′′ sends a special ‘‘return’’ message to P ′′R, A simulates the receipt of the container from P ′′R (this
is possible because the container was never actually sent).
Given the same input and random coins, the simulated version of PROpen under P
′′ has a view identical to the real PROpen
under P , hence the outputmust be the same. Therefore, the probability that A is successful is identical to the probability that
A′′ is successful. This contradicts the hypothesis that P is binding.
P ′′ is hiding. Suppose it is not, then there is some adversary B′′ = B′′Commit that, substituted for P ′RCommit in protocol P ′′ can
guess bwith probability 12 + poly( 1n ). We can construct an adversary B for the protocol P as follows: B runs B′′ until PSCommit
terminates, recording the contents and locations of containers it creates. B then simulates the receipt of all containers it
created that were still held by PS and continues running B′′. If B′′ tests whether a container is sealed, B simulates an ok
response for all containers (note that since PS is an honest party, it cannot break any lock, so this response is always correct).
If B′′ opens a container, B simulates the proper response using the last recorded contents for that container (since only the
creator of the container can alter the contents, this response is always correct).
Given the same input and random coins, the views of B′′ when P ′′ is running and the simulated B′′ when P is running are
identical, hence the output must be the same. Therefore, B can also guess bwith probability 12 + poly( 1n ), contradicting the
hypothesis that P is hiding. 
Lemma 3.7. If neither Alice (the sender) nor Bob (the receiver) break open containers (open a container that is not unlocked),
Alice can compute b, rA | VBob (the information Bob has about b and Alice’s random string at the end of the commitment phase).
Proof. Bob’s view, VBob, is composed of some sequence of the following:
1. Sealmessages for his own containers.
2. Receiptmessages for containers received from Alice.
3. Sendmessages for containers sent to Alice.
4. Open messages sent for containers he created and Alice holds (there is no point in Bob opening a container he created
and also holds — he already knows what it contains).
5. Openedmessages generated by Alice opening a container she created and he holds.
6. Verifymessages he sent.
7. Verifiedmessages received as a response to his Verifymessages.
8. Unlockmessages he sent.
9. Plaintext communication.
Any information Bob has about b, rA must derive from his view of the protocol. Any messages sent by Bob do not add
information about b or rA: the contents of the message are determined solely by rB, which is independent of b and rA, and
by the prefix of the protocol. Therefore, the Seal, Send, Open, Verify and Unlock messages do not contribute information
about b or rA.
The response to a Verify message will always be ok, since Alice never breaks open a container. Therefore, Verified
messages do not contain any information about b or rA.
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It follows that all the information Bob has about b, rA must reside in the Receipt and Opened messages and plaintext
communication. However, this information is also available to Alice: Every Receiptmessage is generated by a Sendmessage
from Alice (so she knows the contents of all Receiptmessages received by Bob). On the other hand, since Bob never breaks
open a container, every Open message he sends must be preceded by an Unlock message from Alice. Thus, Alice must
know which containers he opened (and since she created them, she knows their contents) And, of course, Alice also knows
anything she sent in plaintext to Bob. 
Theorem 3.8. F (BC) cannot be securely realized against computationally unbounded adversaries using F (DWL) as a primitive.
Proof. From Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, we can assume w.l.o.g that at the end of the Commit phase, all of Alice’s containers are
held by Alice and all of Bob’s containers are held by Bob.
From Lemma 3.7, Alice knows everything Bob knows about b and rA. Therefore, she can compute all the possible pairs
b′, r ′A which are consistent with Bob’s view of the protocol.
Assume, in contradiction, that with non-negligible probability (over b and both parties’ random coins), in at least poly( 1n )
of the pairs b′ = 0 and in at least poly( 1n ) of the pairs b′ = 1. Consider the following adversary A = (ACommit, AOpen): ACommit
runs PSCommit with a random input b. AOpen(x) actions depend on b:
Case 1: If b = x, it runs PSOpen.
Case 2: if b = 1 − x, but in at least poly( 1n ) of the pairs b′ = x, it chooses r ′A randomly from this set of pairs and simulates
PSCommit(x), using r
′
A for the random coins, intercepting all commands to F
(DWL) but Seal commands and simulating
the correct responses using the recorded view (note that the contents and ids of Bob’s containers must be identical
no matter which r ′A is chosen, because Bob’s view is identical for all these pairs). A can send Seal commands for the
containers because it currently holds all the containers it created. AOpen(x) then runs PSOpen using the output from the
simulation of PSCommit(x).
Case 3: If b = 1− x, but only a negligible fraction of the pairs b′ = x, it fails.
By the completeness property, the probability that PROpen outputs something other than xmust be negligible in cases 1 and
2. Case 1 occurs with probability 12 and, by our hypothesis, case 2 occurs with non-negligible probability. This contradicts
the binding property of the protocol.
Assume that the probability that both b′ = 0 and b′ = 1 in a non-negligible fraction of the pairs is negligible. Consider
the following adversary B: BCommit runs PRCommit. It then outputs the majority value of b
′ on all the pairs b′, rA consistent with
its view. By our hypothesis, with overwhelming probability b′ = b, contradicting the hiding property of the protocol. Thus,
the protocol is either not binding or not hiding. 
4. Capabilities of the distinguishable envelope model
This model is clearly at least as strong as the DWL model (defined in Section 2.2.1), since we only added capabilities to
the honest players, while the adversary remains the same. In fact, we show that it is strictly stronger, by giving a protocol
for BC in this model (in Section 3.3, we prove that BC is impossible in the DWL model). We also give a protocol for 1r -Strong
Coin Flipping in this model and show that OT is impossible.
4.1. Oblivious transfer is impossible
Let Alice be the sender and Bob the receiver. Consider Alice’s bits a0 and a1, aswell as Bob’s input c , to be randomvariables
taken from some arbitrary distribution. Alice’s view of a protocol execution can also be considered a random variable
VA = (a0, a1, rA,N1, . . . ,Nn), consisting of Alice’s bits, random coins (rA) and the sequence of messages that comprise the
transcript as seen by Alice. In the same way we denote Bob’s view with VB = (c, rB,M1, . . . ,Mn), consisting of Bob’s input
and random coins and the sequence of messages seen by Bob.
The essence of OT (whether UC or not) is that Bob gains information about one of Alice’s bits, but Alice does not know
which one. We can describe the information Bob has about Alice’s bits using Shannon entropy, a basic tool of information
theory. The Shannon entropy of a random variable X , denotedH(X) is ameasure of the ‘‘uncertainty’’ that resides in X . When
X has finite support: H(X) = −∑x Pr[X = x] log Pr[X = x].
Suppose Bob’s view of a specific protocol transcript is vB. What Bob learns about ai (i ∈ {0, 1}) can be described by the
conditional entropy of ai given Bob’s view of the protocol. We write this H(ai | VB = vB). If Bob knows ai at the end of the
protocol then H(ai | VB = vB) = 0, since there is no uncertainty left about the value of ai given Bob’s view. If Bob has no
information at all about ai then H(ai | VB = vB) = 1, since there are two equally likely values of ai given Bob’s view.
We show that in any protocol in the DE Model, Alice can calculate the amount of information Bob has about each of her
bits:
Theorem 4.1. For any protocol transcript where VA = vA and VB = vB, both H(a0 | VB = vB) and H(a1 | VB = vB) are
completely determined by vA
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Proof. Wewill show how to compute H(a0 | VB = vB) using the value of VA. Computing H(a1 | VB = vB)works in the same
way, replacing a0 with a1.
For any injection f and any random variable, the event Y = y is identical to the event f (Y ) = f (y). Therefore, for any
two random variables X and Y , it holds that H(X | Y = y) = H(X | f (Y ) = f (y)). We will describe an injection from VB to a
variable that Alice can (almost) compute:
1. Denote by C the set of all pairs (id, valueid) that appear in some Opened message from M1, . . . ,Mn and such that id is
one of Alice’s envelopes.
2. Denote by O the multiset of all pairs (id, state) that appear in some Verifiedmessage fromM1, . . . ,Mn. This is a multiset
because the same envelope may be verified multiple times. We only count the first Verified message after a Receipt
message for the same envelope, however (i.e. if Bob verified the same envelope more than once without sending it to
Alice between verifications, we ignore all but the first).
3. Denote M ′ the subsequence of the messages M1, . . . ,Mn consisting only of Receiptmessages from F (DE) and plaintext
messages from Alice. We considerM ′ to contain the indices of the messages in the original sequence.
Let f (VB) = (O, C, c, rB,M ′). To show that f is one-to-one, we show that given (O, C, c, rB,M ′) it is possible to compute VB
by simulating Bob. The simulation proceeds as follows:
1. Run Bob (using c for the input and rB for the random coins) until Bob either sends a message to F (DE) or should receive
a message from Alice (we an assume w.l.o.g. that Bob always knows when he is supposed to receive a message). If Bob
asks to send a message to Alice the simulation pretends to have done so.
2. If Bob sends a message to F (DE), we simulate a response from F (DE):
(a) If Bob sends an Open message for one of Alice’s envelopes, we can look up the contents in C and respond with a
simulated Openedmessage.
(b) If Bob sends an Verify message for one of his envelopes, we can look up the result in O and respond with a
simulated Verified message (if the envelope was verified multiple times, we return the result corresponding to the
current request from the multiset, or the previous returned result if Bob did not send the envelope to Alice between
verifications).
(c) If Bob sends an Sealmessage, we store the value (and do nothing, since no response is expected).
(d) If Bob sends an Open message for one of his own envelopes, we respond with an Opened message using the value
stored earlier.
(e) The simulation also keeps track of the locations of simulated envelopes (so that it can respond correctly if Bob tries
an illegal operation, such as opening an envelope that is not in his possession).
3. If Bob should receive a message, we simulate either a plaintext message from Alice or a Receiptmessage from F (DE) by
looking it up inM ′.
Given rB, Bob is deterministic, so the simulation transcript must be identical to the original protocol view.
Finally, note that the randomvariables a0 and (c, rB)must be independent (otherwise even before beginning the protocol,
Bob has information about Alice’s input bits). Hence, for any random variable X: H(a0 | X, c, rB) = H(a0 | X). In particular,
H(a0 | O, C, c, rB,M ′) = H(a0 | O, C,M ′).
However, Alice can compute O, C,M ′ from VA: Alice can compute M ′ since any Receipt messages Bob received must
have been a response to a Sendmessage sent by Alice, and all messages sent by Alice (including plaintext messages) can be
computed from her view of the protocol.
We can assume w.l.o.g. that Bob opens all the envelopes that remain in his possession at the end of the protocol (if the
protocol is secure, the protocol in which Bob opens the envelopes at the end must be secure as well, since a corrupt Bob can
always do so without getting caught). Likewise, we can assumew.l.o.g. that both players verify all of their envelopes as they
are returned by the other player (again, this can be done by a corrupt player without leaking any information to the other
player, so the protocol that includes this step cannot be less secure than the same protocol without it).
C consists of the contents of all of Alice’s envelopes that Bob opened. Obviously, Alice knows the contents of all her
envelopes (since she created them). To compute C , she only needs to know which of them were opened by Bob. Each of her
envelopes is either in her possession or in Bob’s possession at the end of the protocol; Alice can tell which is the case by
checking if the envelope was sent more times than it was received. If it is not in her possession, she can assume Bob opened
it. If it is in her possession, she verified the seal on the envelope every time it was received from Bob and the results of the
verification are in her view of the protocol. If Bob opened it, at least one of the verifications must have failed. Thus, Alice can
compute C . Similarly, her view tells her which of Bob’s envelopes she opened and howmany times each envelope was sent
to Bob. Since she can assume Bob verified each envelope every time it was returned to him, she can compute the results of
the Verifiedmessages Bob received (and so she can compute O).
Thus, Alice can compute H(a0 | O, C,M ′) = H(a0 | f (VB) = f (vB)) = H(a0 | VB = vB). 
4.2. Bit commitment
In this section, we give a protocol for BC using DEs. The protocol realizes a weak version of BC (defined in Section 2.4.1).
Theorem 2.1 implies that WBC is sufficient to realize ‘‘standard’’ BC.
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Protocol 4.1 ( 34 -WBC).
To implement Commit b:
1. The receiver prepares four sealed envelopes, two containing a 0 and two a 1 in random order. The receiver sends the
envelopes to the sender.
2. The sender opens three envelopes (chosen randomly) and verifies that they are not all the same. Let r be the value in the
remaining (sealed) envelope. The sender sends d = b⊕ r to the receiver.
To implement Open:
1. The sender sends b and the sealed envelope to the receiver.
2. The receiver verifies that the envelope is sealed, then opens it to extract r . He verifies that d = b⊕ r .
The proof for the security of this protocol, stated as the following theorem, appears in Section 9:
Theorem 4.2. Protocol 4.1 securely realizes F (
3
4−WBC) in the UC model.
4.3. A strongly fair coin flipping protocol with bias O( 1r )
The construction uses RISs (defined in Section 2.4.2), whichwe then show how to implement in the DEmodel. The idea is
similar to the ‘‘standard’’ CF protocol using BC: Alice commits to a random bit a. Bob sends Alice a random bit b, after which
Alice opens her commitment. The result is a⊕ b.
The reason that this is not a strongly fair CF protocol is that Alice learns the result of the toss before Bob and can decide to
quit before opening her commitment. Using RIS instead of BC solves this problem, because Bob can open the commitment
without Alice’s help.
Ideally, we would like to replace BC with RIS (and have Alice verify that Bob did not break the seal before sending b). This
almost works; If Bob quits before verification, or if the verification fails, Alice can use a as her bit, because Bob had to have
decided to quit before seeing a. If Bob quits after verification (and the verification passed), Alice can use a ⊕ b, since Bob
sent b before learning a.
The reason this idea fails is that RIS allows Bob to see the committed bit during verification. If he does not like it, he can
cause the verification to fail.
We can overcome the problemwith probability 1− 1r by doing the verification in r rounds. The trick is that Alice secretly
decides on a ‘‘threshold round’’: after this round a failure in verification would not matter. Bob does not know which is the
threshold round (he can guess with probability at most 1/r). If Bob decides to stop before the threshold round, either he did
not attempt to illegally open a commitment (in which case his decision to stop cannot depend on the result of the coin flip),
or he illegally opened all the remaining commitments (opening less than that gives no information about the result). In this
case, all subsequent verifications will fail, so he may as well have simply stopped at this round (note that the decision to
open is made before knowing the result of the coin flip). Clearly, anything Bob does after the threshold round has no effect
on the result. Only if he chooses to illegally open commitments during the threshold round can this have an effect on the
outcome (since in this case, whether or not the verification fails determines whether Alice outputs a or a⊕ b).
The full protocol follows:
Protocol 4.2 ( 1r -SCF). The protocol uses r instances of F
(RIS):
1. Alice chooses r random bits a1, . . . , ar and sends Commit ai to F
(RIS)
i (this is done in parallel). Denote a = a1⊕ · · · ⊕ ar .
2. Bob chooses a random bit b. If Alice halts before finishing the commit stage, Bob outputs b. Otherwise, he sends b to Alice.
3. If Bob halts before sending b, Alice outputs a. Otherwise, Alice chooses a secret index j ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
4. The protocol now proceeds in r rounds. Round i has the following form:
(a) Alice verifies that Bob did not open the commitment for ai.
(b) Bob opens the commitment for ai (this actually occurs during the RIS verification step).
5. If the verification for round j and all preceding rounds was successful, Alice outputs a⊕ b. Otherwise, Alice outputs a.
6. Bob always outputs a⊕ b (if Alice halts before completing the verification rounds, Bob opens the commitments himself
(instead of waiting for verification).
The proof of the following theorem appears in Section 7:
Theorem 4.3. Protocol 4.2 securely realizes F (
1
r −SCF) in the UC model.
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4.3.1. Implementation of remotely inspectable seals
We give protocol that realizes 12 -RIS. We can then apply Theorem 2.2 to amplify it to -RIS for some negligible . In
addition to the F (DE) functionality, the protocol utilizes a weak coin flip functionality with one-sided error (only Bob can
cheat). This can be implemented using DEs. The WCF protocol in the DWL model, described in Section 3.1, has one-sided
error in the DE model (although we do not give a formal proof in this article). Alternatively, Blum’s protocol for CF also has
this property, and can be implemented using BC.
Protocol 4.3 ( 12 -RIS).
To implement Commit b:
1. Alice sends two envelopes, denoted e0 and e1 to Bob, both containing the bit b.
To implement Verify:
1. Alice initiates a weakly fair coin flip with Bob (the coin flip has one-sided error, so that Alice is unable to cheat).
2. Denote the result of the coin flip r . Bob opens envelope e1−r and outputs (Verifying, b) (where b represents the contents
of the envelope. Bob returns envelope er to Alice.
3. Alice waits for the result of the coin flip and the envelope from Bob. If the result of the coin flip is ⊥, or if Bob does not
return an envelope, Alice outputs ⊥. Otherwise, Alice verifies that Bob returned the correct envelope and that it is still
sealed. If either of these conditions are not satisfied, she outputs⊥, otherwise she outputs Sealed.
To implement Open:
1. Bob randomly chooses one of the envelopes in his possession. He opens the envelope and outputs (Opened, b) (where b
is the contents of the envelope). Bob opens the other envelope as well.
The proof of the following theorem appears in Section 8.1:
Theorem 4.4. Protocol 4.3 securely realizes F (
1
2−RIS) in the UC model.
4.4. Lower bound for strongly fair coin flipping
In [8], Cleve proves that for any CF protocol in the standardmodel, one of the parties can bias the result byΩ(1/r)where
r is the number of rounds. This is true even if all we allow the adversary to do is to stop early. An inspection of his proof
shows that this is also true in the DE model:
Theorem 4.5. Any r-round strongly fair CF protocol in the DE model can be biased byΩ( 1r ).
Themain idea in Cleve’s proof is to construct a number of adversaries for each round of the protocol. He then proves that the
average bias for all the adversaries is at leastΩ( 1r ), so there must be an adversary that can bias the result by that amount.
Each adversary runs the protocol correctly until it reaches ‘‘its’’ round. It then computeswhat an honest player would output
had the other party stopped immediately after that round. Depending on the result, it either stops in that round or continues
for one more round and then stops.
The only difficulty in implementing such an adversary in the DEmodel is that to compute its result it might need to open
envelopes, in which case it may not be able to continue to the next round. The solution is to notice that it can safely open
any envelopes that would not be sent to the other party at the end of the round (since it will stop in the next round in any
case). Also, it must be able to compute the result without the envelopes it is about to send (since if the other party stopped
after the round ends, he would no longer have access to the envelopes). Therefore, Cleve’s proof is valid in the DE model as
well.
5. Capabilities of the indistinguishable weak lock model
The addition of indistinguishability makes the tamper-evident seal model startlingly strong. Even in the Weak Lock
variant, unconditionally secure OT is possible (and, therefore, so are BC and CF). In this section, we construct a 1–2 OT






-PCWOT protocol (for a definition of the functionality, see 2.4.3).
We can then use Theorem 2.3 to construct a full 1–2 OT protocol.
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5.1. A ( 12 ,
1
3 )-possibly cheating weak oblivious transfer protocol
The basic idea for the protocol is that the sender can encode information in the order of containers, not just in their
contents. When the containers are indistinguishable, the sender can shuffle containers (thus changing the information
encoded in their order) without knowing the identities of the containers themselves; this gives us the obliviousness.
In order to get a more intuitive understanding of the protocol it is useful to first consider a protocol that works only
against an ‘‘honest but curious’’ adversary:
1. the sender prepares two containers containing the bits (0, 1), and sends them to the receiver.
2. the receiver prepares two containers of his own, also containing (0, 1). If his bit is 0, he returns both pairs to the sender
with his pair first. If his bit is 1, he returns both pairs to the sender with his pair second.
3. At this point, the sender no longer knows which of the pairs is which (as long as she does not open any containers).
However, she knows that both pairs contain (0, 1). She now encodes her bits, one on each pair (by leaving the pair alone
for a 0 bit or exchanging the containers within the pair for a 1 bit). She returns both pairs to the receiver.
4. the receiver verifies that both his containers are still sealed and then opens them. The bit he learns from the sender can be
deduced from the order of the containers in the pair. He randomly shuffles the sender’s pair and returns it to the sender.
5. the sender verifies that the containers in the remaining pair are still sealed. Since the receiver shuffled the containers
within the pair, the original encoded bit is lost, so the contents of the containers give her no information about the
receiver’s bit.
Unfortunately, this simple protocol fails when the adversary is not limited to be passive. For example, an active adversary
that corrupts the receiver can replace the sender’s pair of the containers with his own at stage (2). In stage (3), the sender
encodes both her bits on the receiver’s containers, while he still has the sender’s pair to return at stage (4).
To prevent this attack, we can let the sender start with additional container pairs (say, three). Then, in stage (3), the
sender can randomly choose two of her pairs and have the receiver tell her which ones they are. She can then verify that
the pairs are sealed and that they are the correct ones. Now she is left with two pairs (one hers and one the receiver’s), but
the order may not be what the receiver wanted. So in themodified protocol, before the sender encodes her bits, the receiver
tells her whether or not to switch the pairs.
If the receiver tampered with any of her pairs (or replaced them), with probability 23 the sender will catch him (since he
cannot know in advance which pairs the sender will choose to open). However, this modification gives the sender a new
way to cheat: She can secretly open one of the pairs at random (before choosing which or her pairs to verify). There are four
pairs, and only one is the receiver’s, so with probability 34 she chooses one of her pairs. She can then ask the receiver to give
her the locations of the other two pairs. Once she knows the location of the receiver’s pair, she knows which bit he wants to
learn.
To counter this attack, we let the receiver add two additional pairs as well (so that he returns six pairs at stage (2)). After
the sender chooses which of her pairs to verify, the receiver randomly chooses two of his pairs to verify. He gives the sender
the locations and she returns the pairs to him. Since there are now six containers, three of which are the receiver’s, if the








However, although the receiver will eventually learn that the sender cheated, if he did not catch her here (he does not
with probability 13 ), the sender will learn his bit before he can abort the protocol. We prevent this by having the sender
choose a random value r , and encoding a0 ⊕ r and a1 ⊕ r instead a0 and a1. At the end of the protocol the receiver asks the
sender to send him either r or a0⊕ a1⊕ r , depending on the value of his bit. Learning only one of the values encoded by the
sender gives the receiver no information about the sender’s bits. Given the additional information from the sender, it allows
him to learn the bit he requires, but gain no information about the other bit. As long as the sender does not know which of
the two encoded values the receiver learns, his request at the end of the protocol does not give her any information about
his bit.
Similarly, the receiver can gain information about both of the sender’s bits by opening her containers as well as his after
she encodes them. This can be prevented by having the sender use the same value for both of her containers (i.e., put 1 in
both containers). Since the receiver should never open the sender’s pair if he follows the protocol, this should not matter. If
he has not opened the pair previously, however, he now has no information about the bit encoded in the pair (since he does
not know which container was originally the first in the pair).
There remains a final problem with the protocol: the receiver can cheat by lying to the sender about the locations of his
pairs when he asks her to return them, and instead asking for the sender’s remaining pair (alongwith one of his). In this case,
the sender remains with two of the receiver’s pairs, giving the receiver both of her bits. We solve this by having the sender
randomly shuffle the pairs she returns to the receiver. If the pairs are indeed the receiver’s, he can tell how she shuffled
them. For the sender’s pair, however, he has to guess (since he does not know their original order). This is almost enough,
except that the receiver can still cheat successfully with probability 12 by simply guessing the correct answer. To decrease
the probability of successfully cheating to 13 , we use triplets instead of pairs, and require the receiver to guess the location
of the second container in the triplet under the sender’s permutation.
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The resulting protocol is what we require. As the protocol is fairly complex, we specify separately the sender’s side
(Protocol 5.1a) and the receiver’s side (Protocol 5.1b).
Protocol 5.1a 12 ,
1
3 -PCWOT (Sender)
Input: bits a0, a1.
1: Prepare three triplets of containers. All the containers contain the value 1.
2: Send all nine containers to the receiver.
3: Wait to receive 18 containers (six triplets) from the receiver.
4: Select a random index i ∈R {1, 2, 3} and send i to the receiver.
5: Wait to receive indices (j1, j2) and (k1, k2) from the receiver {these should be the locations of the sender’s triplets (except
for triplet i) and the locations of two of the receiver’s triplets}.
6: Open all the containers in triplets j1 and j2 and verify that they are the correct containers.
7: Choose two random permutations pi1, pi2 ∈R S3.
8: Shuffle the triplets k1 and k2 using pi1 and pi2, respectively.
9: Send the shuffled triplets k1 and k2 to the receiver. {the remaining unopened triplets should be the original triplet i and
one of the receiver’s triplets}
10: Wait to receive indices `1, `2 from the receiver.
11: Verify that `1 = pi1(2) and `2 = pi2(2). If not, abort.
12: Choose a random bit r ∈R {0, 1}.
13: if a0 ⊕ r = 1 then {Encode a0 ⊕ r on first remaining triplet}
14: Exchange first two containers in the first triplet. {encode a one}
15: else
16: Do nothing. {encode a zero}
17: end if
18: if a1 ⊕ r = 1 then {Encode a1 ⊕ r on second remaining triplet}
19: Exchange first two containers in the second triplet. {encode a one}
20: else
21: Do nothing. {encode a zero}
22: end if
23: Returns all six remaining containers to the receiver.
24: Wait to receive a bit b′ from the receiver.
25: if b′ = 0 then
26: Set x′ ← r .
27: else
28: Set x′ ← a0 ⊕ a1 ⊕ r .
29: end if
30: Send x′ to the receiver
We prove the following theorem in Section 10:




3−PCWOT ) in the UC model.
6. Proof of security for weakly fair coin flipping protocol (Protocol 3.1)
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.1. The proof follows the standard scheme for proofs in the UC model (elaborated in
Section 2.5). We deal separately with the case whereA corrupts Alice and whereA corrupts Bob.
6.1. A corrupts Bob
We first describe the ideal simulator, then prove that the environment’s view in the ideal and real worlds is identically
distributed. The ideal simulator, I, proceeds as follows:
1. I waits until ideal Alice sends a Valuemessage to F (WCF) and it receives the (Approve, d)message from F (WCF). I now
continues running the protocol withA, simulating F (DWL). I sends 4n Receiptmessages toA.
2. I chooses n random quads exactly as Alice would when following the protocol. Consider a quad ‘‘committed’’ when the
contents of all unopened containers in the quad are identical (i.e., if three containers have already been opened or if two
containers have been opened and contained the same value).
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Protocol 5.1b 12 ,
1
3 -PCWOT (Receiver)
Input: Choice bit b.
1: Wait to receive nine containers from the sender.
2: Prepare three triplets of containers (wewill call them triplets 4, 5 and 6). Each triplet contains the values (0, 1, 0) in that
order.
3: Choose a random permutation σ ∈ S6.
4: Shuffle all six triplets using σ . {the three containers in each triplet are not shuffled}
5: Send all 18 containers to the sender.
6: Wait to receive an index i from the sender.
7: Send the indices σ({1, 2, 3} \ {i}) and σ({5, 6})to the sender. {the locations of the sender’s triplets except for triplet i
and the locations of the last two triplets created by the receiver}.
8: Wait to receive two triplets from the sender.
9: Verifies that all the containers in the received triplets were unopened and that they are from the original triplets 5 and
6.
10: Open the containers. Let `1, `2 be the index of the container containing 1 in each triplet. Send `1, `2 to the sender. {e.g.,
`1 should be pi1(2)}
11: Wait to receive six containers (two triplets) from the sender.
12: if σ(i) > σ(4) then
13: Verify that all the containers in the first triplet are sealed and were originally from triplet 4. If not, abort.
14: Let x = 1 iff the first container in the first triplet contains 1. {x = a0 ⊕ r = 1}
15: Set c ← 0
16: else
17: Verify that all the containers in the second triplet are sealed and were originally from triplet 4. If not, abort.
18: Let x = 1 iff the first container in the second triplet contains 1. {x = a1 ⊕ r = 1}
19: Set c ← 1
20: end if
21: Send b⊕ c to the sender.
22: Wait to receive response x′ from the sender.
23: Output x⊕ x′. {x⊕ x′ = ab}
3. As long as there is at least one uncommitted quad, I responds to Openmessages fromA by returning the values chosen
in stage (2).
4. When only a single uncommitted quad remains, denote by x the xor of the values for the committed quads. I will force
the last unopened container in the quad to have the value x ⊕ d, by choosing the responses from the distribution of
permutations conditioned on the last container having the forced value.
5. I waits forA to return one container from each quad.
6. If A halts before returning n containers, or if any of the n containers was opened, I sends a Halt command to F (WCF).
Otherwise, it sends a Continue command.
7. I simulates the Unlockedmessages for all the containers still held byA. It continues the simulation untilA halts.
Lemma 6.1. For any Z and A, when A corrupts Bob, Z’s view of the simulated protocol in the ideal world and Z’s view in the
real world are identically distributed.
Proof. Z’s view of the protocol in both worlds is identical, except for the contents of the containers sent by Alice. An
inspection of the simulation shows that the distribution of the contents is also identical: in both the real and ideal worlds,
the contents of each quad are uniformly random permutations of (0, 0, 1, 1). Also in both cases, the xor of the committed
value of all the quads is a uniformly random bit b. IfA does not open more than three containers in any quad, and returns
containers according to the protocol, this is the bit output by Alice in both the real and ideal worlds. If A opens all four
containers, or does not return them according to the protocol, Alice will output⊥ in both the real and ideal worlds. 
6.2. A corrupts Alice
As in the previous case, we first describe the ideal simulator, then prove that the environment’s view in the ideal and real
worlds is identically distributed. The ideal simulator, I, proceeds as follows:
1. I sends a Valuemessage to F (WCF) and waits to receive the (Approve, d)message from F (WCF).
2. I waits forA to send the 4n Seal and Sendmessages to F (WCF).
Case 2.1: If at least one of the quads is proper (i.e., contains two 0s and two 1s), I chooses which containers to send in the
other quads randomly, and then chooses a container to send in the proper quad so that the xor of all the sent
containers is d.
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Case 2.2: If all the quads are improper, I chooses the containers to send from the uniform distribution conditioned on the
event that at least one quad has three remaining containers that contain identical bits.
3. I sends the chosen containers toA, and waits forA to unlock the remaining containers.
4. IfA does not unlock all the containers, or if one of the remaining quads is improper, I sends a Halt command to F (WCF).
Otherwise I sends a Continue command to F (WCF).
Lemma 6.2. For any  > 0 there exists n = O(log 1

), such that for any Z andA, whenA corrupts Alice the statistical distance
between Z’s view of the simulated protocol in the ideal world and Z’s view in the real world is less than .
Proof. Z’s view of the protocol in both worlds is identical, except for the choice of containers sent by Bob. In the real world,
Bob’s choices are always uniformly random. If not all quads are improper, the distribution of Bob’s choices in the ideal world
is also uniformly random (since d is uniformly random, and the only choice made by I that is not completely random is
to condition on the xor of the quad values being d). If all the quads are improper, the statistical difference between the
uniform distribution and I’s choices is exponentially small in n, since each quad has three remaining identical containers
with probability at least 34 , and the events for each quad are independent (thus the probability that none of the quads was
bad is at most ( 34 )
n). 
7. Proof of security for strongly fair coin flip protocol (Protocol 4.2)
In this section, we prove Theorem 4.3. The proof follows the standard scheme for proofs in the UC model (elaborated in
Section 2.5). We deal separately with the case whereA corrupts the sender and whereA corrupts the receiver.
7.1. A corrupts Alice
1. I sends a Value command to F (
1
r −SCF). If it receives a ChooseValuemessage from F ( 1r −SCF) it randomly chooses a bit d
and sends a Bias d command. Denote by d the result of the coin flip.
2. I waits forA to commit to the bits a1, . . . , ar . IfA stops before committing to r bits, I halts as well.
3. Otherwise, I simulates Bob sending b = d⊕ a1⊕· · ·⊕ ar to Alice. I then continues the protocol with the simulated Bob
behaving honestly.
Lemma 7.1. For any environment machine Z, and any real adversary A that corrupts only Alice, the output of Z when
communicatingwithA in the realworld is identically distributed to the output ofZwhen communicatingwithI in the idealworld.
Proof. The proof is by inspection. First, note that the output of the ideal Bob always matches the output of the simulated
Bob (by the choice of b). Since I simulates Bob following the protocol precisely, the only difference Z could notice is the
distribution of b. However, this is uniform in both the real and idealworlds, since in the idealworld d (the result ofF (
1
r −SCF)’s
coin flip) is uniformly distributed, and in the real world Bob chooses b uniformly. Thus,Z’s view is identically distributed in
both worlds. 
7.2. A corrupts Bob
1. I sends a Value command to F (
1
r −SCF). We will say that I ‘‘has control’’ if it received a ChooseValuemessage, and that
I ‘‘does not have control’’ if it received a ‘(Coin, d)message from F (
1
r −SCF).
2. If I has control, it chooses a random bit d itself.
3. I simulates Bob receiving commit messages from F (RIS)1 , . . . ,F
(RIS)
r .
4. I waits for Bob (controlled byA) to send b to Alice.
Case 1: IfA halts before sending b, I sends a Bias d command to F (
1
r −SCF) and also halts.
Case 2: IfA attempts to open the commitments before sending b, or if b = 0, I sends a Bias d command to F ( 1r −SCF) (this
is ignored if I does not have control). I then randomly chooses a2, . . . , ar , sets a1 ← d⊕i>1 ai and continues the
protocol, proceeding as if Alice sent Commit ai to F
(RIS)
i . In this case, no matter what Bob does, in the real-world
protocol Alice must eventually output d.
Case 3: IfA sends b = 1 before opening any commitments:
i. I begins simulating the protocol rounds, randomly choosing a value for each ai whenA opens (or simulated Alice
verifies)F (RIS)i . The simulation continues in this manner until the contents of all but one of the commitments have
been revealed (either becauseA prematurely opened the commitments, or during the verification phase).
ii. Call a round j ‘‘good’’ if the verification stage of round j succeeded and all previous rounds were good. Denote the
current round by i, the index of the highest good round so far by j (by definition j < i), and by k the smallest index
such that the committed bit in instance F (RIS)k is not yet known to A (note that k ≥ i, since all instances up to i
must have been revealed during verification). The actions of I now depend on i, j, k and whether I has control:
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Case 3.1: If i < k, or if F (RIS)k is being opened (rather than verified): (this is equivalent to the case where even in the real
worldA could not bias the result)
• I sends a Bias d command to F ( 1r −SCF).
• I chooses a random index i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
• If i∗ > j, I sets ak ← d⊕`6=k a`, otherwise ak ← b⊕ d⊕`6=k a`.• I continues the simulation as if Alice had actually chosen the bits a1, . . . , ar to commit and the secret
threshold round i∗. Note that if Alice had actually followed the protocol, the choice of ak ensures that she
always outputs d. This is because round iwill certainly fail verification (sinceF (RIS)i has already been opened),
so round jwill remain the last round which passed verification.
Case 3.2: If i = k, F (RIS)k is being verified and I does not have control: (this is equivalent to the case where A did not
correctly guess the secret threshold round, but could have cheated successfully if he had)
• I chooses a random index i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , r} \ {i}.
• If i∗ > j, I sets ak ← d⊕`6=k a`, otherwise ak = b⊕ d⊕`6=k a`.• I continues the simulation as if Alice had actually chosen the bits a1, . . . , ar to commit and the secret
threshold round i∗. Note that if Alice had actually followed the protocol, the choice of ak ensures that
she always outputs d. This is because, by the choice of i∗, it does not matter whether or not round i fails
verification (either i∗ > j, in which case also i∗ > i, or i∗ ≤ j < i).
Case 3.3: If i = k, F (RIS)k is being verified and I has control: (this is equivalent to the case whereA correctly guessed the
secret threshold i, and can cheat successfully)
• I chooses a random bit for ak and continues the simulation.• If A chooses to fail the verification, I sets d∗ ← d⊕` a`, otherwise (the verification succeeds) I sets
d∗ ← b⊕ d⊕` a`.
• I sends a Bias d∗ command to F ( 1r −SCF).
• I continues the simulation untilA halts.
Lemma 7.2. For any environment machine Z, and any real adversary A that corrupts only Bob, the output of Z when
communicatingwithA in the realworld is identically distributed to the output ofZwhen communicatingwithI in the idealworld.
Proof. Z’s view can consist of a1, . . . , ar (the results of opening the commitments) and of the ideal Alice’s output d.
In both the real and ideal worlds, in all cases the first r − 1 commitments opened byA are independent and uniformly
random (this can be easily seen by inspecting the simulator).
For any adversary that reaches Case 1 or Case 2 in the real world, the final commitment is always the xor of b (the bit
sent byA), the first r− 1 commitments and the output of the real Alice (since the threshold round does not affect the result
in this case). This is also the situation in the ideal world.
For an adversary that reaches Case 3.1, the final commitment is the xor of the first r − 1 commitments and the output of
the real Alice with probability r−jr (this is the probability that the secret threshold round was after the last good round), and
the complement of that with probability jr (the probability that the threshold round is in the first j rounds). By the choice of
i∗, the distribution of the last commitment in the ideal model is identical in this case.
Finally, consider the adversary that reaches Case 3.2 or Case 3.3. This adversary is honest until round i, then opens all
commitments except F (RIS)i , whose contents are revealed during verification.
1. In the real world, with probability 1r round i is the threshold round, in which case the final commitment is the xor of the
first r − 1 commitments and d if A fails the verification and the complement of that if A does not fail. With the same
probability, I is in control, and therefore executes Case 3.3 (which calculates the final commitment in the same way).
2. With probability 1− 1r , round i is not the threshold round. In this case, the final commitment is the xor of the first r − 1
commitments and d with probability r−ir−1 (the threshold round is after i), and the complement of that with probability
i−1
r−1 (the threshold round is before i). In the same way, with probability 1− 1r , I is not in control, and executes Case 3.2.
The choice of i∗ ensures the correct distribution of the final commitment.
Since any adversary must reach one of the cases above, we have shown that for all adversaries Z’s view of the protocol
is identical in the real and ideal worlds. 
Together, Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2 imply Theorem 4.3.
8. Proof of security for remotely inspectable seals
Below, we prove Theorem 4.4 (in Section 8.1) and Theorem 2.2 (in Section 8.2).
8.1. Proof of security for 12 -RIS protocol (Protocol 4.3)
The proof of Theorem 4.4 follows the standard scheme for proofs in the UC model (elaborated in Section 2.5). We deal
separately with the case whereA corrupts the sender and whereA corrupts the receiver.
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8.1.1. A corrupts Alice (the sender)
To simulate the Commit command, I waits untilA sends two envelopes to Bob. Denote the envelopes e0 and e1.
Case 1: IfA does not send the envelopes, I sends the Halt command to F (
1
2−RIS) (causing ideal Bob to output⊥) and halts.
Case 2: If both envelopes contained the same bit b, I sends a Commit bmessage to F (
1
2−RIS).
Case 3: If the envelopes contained two different bits, I randomly selects a bit b and sends Commit b to F (
1
2−RIS).
To simulate the Verify command:
1. I waits forA to initiate a coin flip.
2. If both envelopes sent by A contained the same bit, I chooses a random bit r , otherwise it sets r to the index of the
envelope containing b.
3. I sends r as the result of the coin flip toA.
4. I simulates sending envelope er toA.
5. I sends the Verify command to F (
1
2−RIS) and waits for the functionality’s response.
Case 1: If the response is⊥, verifying envelope er will return a brokenmessage.
Case 2: If the response was Sealed, verifying envelope er will return a sealedmessage.
6. I continues the simulation untilA halts.
Note that the Open command need not be simulated in this case — in both the ideal and the real worlds this does not
involve the sender at all.
Lemma 8.1. For any environment machine Z, and any real adversary A that corrupts only Alice, the output of Z when
communicatingwithA in the realworld is identically distributed to the output ofZwhen communicatingwithI in the idealworld.
Proof. The proof is by case analysis. First, consider the view during the commit stage. Any adversary must fall in one of the
three cases. In Case 1, in both the real and ideal worlds Z’s view consists of Bob outputting ⊥ and Alice halting. In Case 2
and Case 3, Z’s view looks the same fromA’s point of view, and in both worlds Bob will output Committed.
If Z tells Bob to open the commitment before the verify stage, The output will be identical in the real and ideal worlds
(it will be (Opened, b), where b is a uniformly random bit ifA committed two different bits).
During the verification stage, r is always a random uniform bit. There are only two cases to consider: either Z told Bob
to open the commitment earlier, or it did not. If it did, F (
1
2−RIS) will return a failed verification, andA will also see a failed
verification (exactly as would be the case in the real world). If it did not,Awill see a successful verification in both the real
and ideal worlds.
Thus, in all cases Z’s view is identically distributed in both worlds. 
8.1.2. A corrupts Bob (the receiver)
The simulation is in two phases. In the initial phase (corresponding to the Commit and Open commands):
1. I waits until it receives Committed from F (
1
2−RIS). It then simulatesA receiving two envelopes, e0 and e1.
2. IfA requests to open any of the envelopes, I sends an Open command to F (
1
2−RIS) and waits to receive the (Opened, b)
response. It then continues the simulation as if both envelopes had contained b.
The second phase beginswhen I receives a (Verifying, x)message fromF (
1
2−RIS) (signifying that ideal Alice sent aVerify
command). I initiates the verification phase withA.
1. I chooses r in the following way: If, in the verification message, x 6=⊥ (that is, I has a choice about whether the
verificationwill fail), it chooses r randomly from the set of unopened envelopes (if bothwere opened, it chooses randomly
between them). If, in the verification message, x =⊥ (that is, the verification will definitely fail), I chooses r randomly
from the set of opened envelopes (note that at least one envelope must be open for this to occur, because otherwise I
would not have sent an Open command to F (
1
2−RIS) and would thus always have a choice).
2. I continues the simulation following the protocol exactly, letting the contents of the envelopes both be b (where b← x
if x 6=⊥), otherwise it is the response to the Open command sent in the previous phase.
3. The simulation continues untilA returns an envelope. If that envelope was opened, or its index does not match r , I fails
the verification by sending a Halt command to F (
1
2−RIS). If the envelope was not opened and its index does match r , I
sends the ok command toF (
1
2−RIS) (note that if I had no choice, the index r alwaysmatches an envelope thatwas already
opened).
Lemma 8.2. For any environment machine Z, and any real adversary A that corrupts only Bob, the output of Z when
communicatingwithA in the realworld is identically distributed to the output ofZwhen communicatingwithI in the idealworld.
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Proof. SinceI simulatesAlice exactly, except for the contents of the envelopes and the result of the coin flip andher response
to verification, these are the only things that can differ in Z’s view between the real and ideal worlds.
Simple inspection of the protocol shows that ideal Alice’s output and the contents of the envelopes are always consistent
withA’s view. It remains to show that the distribution of r is identical in the real and ideal worlds. The only case in the ideal
world in which r is not chosen uniformly at random by I is when exactly one of the envelopes was opened. However, this
means Imust have sent an Open command to F (
1
2−RIS), and therefore with probability 12 the verification will fail. Thus, r is
still distributed uniformly in this case. 
Together, Lemmas 8.2 and 8.1 prove Theorem 4.4.
8.2. Amplification for remotely inspectable seals
The following protocol constructs an pk-RIS using k instances of F (p−RIS):
Commit b Alice chooses k random values r1, . . . , rk such that r1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rk = b. She commits to the values in parallel using
F
(p−RIS)
1 , . . . ,F
(p−RIS)
k .
Verify Alice sendsVerify commands in parallel to all k instances ofF (p−RIS). The verification passes only if all k verifications
return Sealed.
Open Bob opens all k commitments. The result is the xor of the values returned.
The ideal adversary in this case is fairly simple. The case where the sender is corrupt is trivial, and we omit it (since the
sender cannot cheat in the basic F (p−RIS) instance). WhenA corrupts the receiver, the simulation works in two phases: In
the initial phase (corresponding to Commit and Open):
1. I waits to receive the Committed command from F (pk−RIS).
2. WheneverA asks to open a commitment for F (p−RIS)i :
Case 2.1: If at least one additional commitment is still unopened, I chooses a random bit ri and returns this as the
committed value.
Case 2.2: If F (p−RIS)i is the last unopened F (p−RIS) instance, I sends an Open command to F (p
k−RIS) and sets the value of
the last commitment to be the xor of all the other commitments and the response, b.
The second phase beginswhen I receives a (Verifying, x)message fromF (pk−RIS) (signifying that ideal Alice sent aVerify
command). I initiates the verification phase withA. Denote the number commitments opened byA by j.
Case 1: If j = k, I has sent an Open command previously to F (pk−RIS).
Case 1.1: If it has a choice about verification (occurs with probability pk), I sends a (Verifying, ri) message to A for all
instances ofF (p−RIS). IfA decides to fail verification in any of the instances, I sends aHalt command toF (pk−RIS).
Otherwise, I sends an ok response to F (pk−RIS).
Case 1.2: Otherwise, I chooses k bits q1, . . . , qk by sampling from the binomial distribution B(k, p), conditioned on at least
one bit being 1 (i.e., equivalent to letting qi = 1 independently with probability p, repeating until not all bits are
0). For each bit where qi = 0 it sends (Verifying, ri), and for the other bits it sends (Verifying,⊥). I sends aHalt
command to F (p
k−RIS).
Case 2: If j < k, no Open command was sent, so I will always have a choice whether to fail verification. I sends a
(Verifying, xi)message toA for each instance ofF (p−RIS). For instanceswhichwere not opened, xi = ri. For instances
that were opened, I chooses with probability p to send xi = ri and with probability 1 − p to send xi =⊥. It then
waits for A to respond. If in any of the instances it chooses xi =⊥, or if A decides to fail verification in any of the
instances, it sends a Halt command to F (pk−RIS). Otherwise, I sends an ok response to F (pk−RIS).
It is easy to see by inspection that the adversary’s view is identical in the real and ideal worlds. Setting k = O(log 1

), the
amplification protocol gives us the proof for Theorem 2.2.
9. Proof of security for bit-commitment protocol
In this section,we prove Protocol 4.1 realizes theWBC functionality (proving Theorem4.2) and showhow to amplifyWBC
to get full BC (proving Theorem 2.1). We begin with the proof of security for Protocol 4.1. The proof follows the standard
scheme for proofs in the UCmodel (elaborated in Section 2.5).We deal separatelywith the casewhereA corrupts the sender
and whereA corrupts the receiver.
9.1. A corrupts Alice (the sender)
We divide the simulation, like the protocol, into two phases.
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9.1.1. Simulation of the Commit phase
I starts the simulated commit protocol with A (I simulates the honest receiver, Bob, in this protocol). I sends four
(simulated) envelopes toA. I chooses a random permutation σ ∈ S4. IfA opens any of the envelopes, I gives results that
are consistentwith Bob following the protocol (i.e., the envelopes’ contents are determined by σ(0, 0, 1, 1)). I continues the
simulation until Alice (controlled byA) sends a bit, d, to Bob (as required by the protocol). The succeeding actions depend
on how many envelopesA opened:
Case 1: A did not open any envelope or opened two envelopes containing different bits. In this case, I chooses a random bit
b and sends a Commit b command to F (
3
4−WBC) .
Case 2: A opened a single envelope containing x. In this case, I chooses a random bit b to be d ⊕ x with probability 13 and
d⊕ (1− x)with probability 23 . I sends a Commit b command to F (
3
4−WBC) .




Case 4: Alice opened three envelopes whose xor is x. Letting b = d⊕ (1− x), I sends a Commit b command to F ( 34−WBC) .
Case 5: Alice opened four envelopes. Letting b = 0, I sends a Commit b command to F ( 34−WBC) .
9.1.2. Simulation of the Open phase
I begins simulating the Open phase of the protocol withA, and waits forA to send an envelope and a bit b′. IfA asks to
open an envelope i before this occurs, I proceeds in the following way:
Let Pconsistent be the set of permutations of (0, 0, 1, 1) that are consistent withA’s view so far (i.e., the permutations that
map the correct contents to the envelopes A has already opened), and Pvalid the set of permutations in which at least one
of the envelopes that will remain unopened after opening i contains b⊕ d (where b is the bit to which I committed in the
Commit phase). I randomly chooses a permutation from Pconsistent ∩ Pvalid and responds to the request to open i as if Bob had
chosen this permutation in the Commit phase.
Note that I’s choice of d and b ensures that at the end of the Commit phase Pconsistent ∩ Pvalid is not empty. As long as i is
not the last unopened envelope, Pconsistent ∩ Pvalid will remain non-empty. If i is the last unopened envelope, I responds with
the value consistent with the other opened envelopes.
Once A sends the bit b′ and an envelope, I proceeds as follows: If the envelope is unopened, and b′ = b, I sends the
Open command toF (
3
4−WBC) . Otherwise, I aborts the protocol by sending theHalt command toF (
3
4−WBC) (and simulating
Bob aborting the protocol toA).
Lemma 9.1. For any environment machine Z and any real adversary A that corrupts only the sender, the output of Z when
communicating with A in the real world is identically distributed to the output of Z when communicating with I in the ideal
world.
Proof. I simulates Bob (the receiver) exactly following the protocol (apart from the envelope contents), and the simulation
ensures that the ideal Bob’s output is consistent with A’s view of the protocol. The only possible differences between Z’s
view in the real and ideal worlds are the contents of the envelopes sent by Bob. Inspection of the protocol and simulation
shows that in both the real and ideal worlds,A always sees a random permutation of (0, 0, 1, 1). 
9.2. A corrupts Bob (the receiver)
As before, the simulation is divided into two phases.
9.2.1. Simulation of the Commit phase
I waits untilA sends four envelopes and until the Committedmessage is received from F (
3
4−WBC) . I’s actions depend
on the contents of the envelopes sent byA:
Case 1: If the envelopes sent byA are a valid quad (two zeroes and two ones), I sends a random bit d toA.
Case 2: If the envelopes are all identical (all zeroes or all ones), I aborts the protocol by sending the Halt command to
F (
3
4−WBC) (and simulating Alice aborting the protocol toA).
Case 3: If the envelopes contain three ones and a zero, or three zeroes and a one, denote x the singleton bit. I sends a Break
message to F (
3
4−WBC) . If the response is⊥, I simulates Alice aborting the protocol toA and halts. If the response is
(Broken, b), I sends b⊕ (1− x) toA.
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9.2.2. Simulation of the Open phase
I waits to receive the (Opened, b) message from F (
3
4−WBC) . It then proceeds depending on A’s actions in the Commit
phase:
Case 1: IfA sent a valid quad, I randomly picks one of the two envelopes that contain d⊕ b and returns it toA.
Case 2: If the envelopes sent by A were not a valid quad, they must be three ones and a zero or three zeroes and a one
(otherwise I would have aborted in the Commit phase). In this case, I randomly chooses one of the three identical
envelopes and simulates returning it toA.
I sends the bit b toA as well. IfA checks whether the envelope returned by Alice is sealed, I simulates an affirmative reply
from F (DE).
Lemma 9.2. For any environment machine Z and any real adversary A that corrupts only the receiver, the output of Z when
communicating with A in the real world is identically distributed to the output of Z when communicating with I in the ideal
world.
Proof. I’s simulation of Alice (the sender) is always consistent with a real Alice that follows the protocol (from A’s point
of view), and it ensures that the ideal Alice’s output is also consistent withA’s view.A’s view consists of d, the bit sent by
Alice in the commit phase (or Alice halting in the commit phase), and the choice of envelope returned in the open phase. In
both the real and ideal worlds, when A sends a proper quad d is uniformly random. When A sends a quad whose bits are
all identical, in both worlds Alice will abort. WhenA sends a quad containing three bits with value 1 − x and one bit with
value x, in the real world Alice would abort with probability 14 (if x is the unopened envelope), and send d = b ⊕ (1 − x)
with probability 34 . In the ideal world, d is distributed identically, since F
( 34−WBC) allows cheating with probability 34 .
In the real world, if A sent a proper quad in the commit phase, the envelope returned in the open phase is a random
envelope and its value, r , satisfies r = d ⊕ b. Inspection of the simulation shows that the same holds in the ideal world. if
A sent an improper quad in the commit phase (conditioned on Alice not aborting), the envelope is randomly selected from
one of the three containing the same bit, and its value satisfies (1− r) = d⊕ b. Again, this holds in the ideal world.
Thus, Z’s views are identically distributed in both worlds. 
Together, Lemmas 9.1 and 9.2 imply Theorem 4.2.
9.3. Amplification for weak bit commitment
The following protocol constructs an pk-WBC using k instances of F (p−WBC):
Commit b Alice chooses k random values r1, . . . , rk such that r1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ rk = b. She commits to the values in parallel using
F
(p−WBC)
1 , . . . ,F
(k−WBC)
1 .
Open Alice opens all k commitments. The result is the xor of the values returned.
The proof that this protocol securely realizesF (p
k−WBC) is extremely similar to the proof of the RIS amplification protocol
(in Section 8.2), and we omit it here. Letting k = O(log 1

), the amplification protocol gives us the proof for Theorem 2.1.
10. Proof of security for oblivious transfer protocol
This section contains the proof of Theorem 5.1. The proof follows the standard scheme for proofs in the UC model
(elaborated in Section 2.5).Wedeal separatelywith the casewhereA corrupts the sender andwhereA corrupts the receiver.
Note thatwhenA corrupts the sender,I simulates an honest receiver and references to steps in the protocol refer to Protocol
5.1b, while whenA corrupts the receiver, I is simulating an honest sender and the steps refer to Protocol 5.1a.
10.1. A corrupts the receiver





3−PCWOT ). I waits for the sender to send a Send command, then begins simulating the real-world protocol by send-
ing nine Receipt messages to A (acting for the receiver). Call a triplet of containers in which all containers are sealed and
all belonged to the original triplet good. We now describe a decision tree for I. The edges in the tree correspond either to





Case 1Ď: All the triplets created by the sender are returned byA at step (3) and all are good. In this case, I randomly chooses
i as specified in the protocol and continues the simulation until step (5). The protocol continues depending onA’s
actions:
Case 1.1Ď: A sent incorrect locations for the sender’s triplets σ({j1, j2}) 6= {1, 2, 3} \ {i}. In this case, the real sender would
have aborted, so I aborts.
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Case 1.2Ď: A sent correct locations for the triplets {1, 2, 3} \ {i}, but one of the triplets he wants the sender to return (k1 or
k2) is actually triplet i. I chooses pi1 randomly as required by the protocol (note: below, we always refer to the
permutation used shuffle the receiver’s triplet as pi1 and the permutation used to shuffle the sender’s triplet as
pi2). The simulation continues depending on whether I cheated successfully:
Case 1.2.1: I cheated successfully and received b0 and b1 (this occurs with probability 13 ). In this case, I continues the
simulation until step (10), whereA sends `2, its guess for pi2(2), to the sender. At this point I always accepts
(equivalently, it selects pi2 at random from the set of permutations for whichpi2(2) = `2). I can now continue
simulating a real sender, following the protocol exactly.
Case 1.2.2: I failed to cheat and did not receive b0, b1. I continues the simulation until the end of step (10), where A
sends `2, its guess for pi2(2). At this point I always aborts (equivalently, it selects pi2 at random from the set
of permutations for which pi2(2) 6= `2, and continues the simulation for the sender, who will then abort).
Case 1.3Ď: A sent correct locations for the triplets {1, 2, 3} \ {i} and both the triplets he asks the sender to return are the
receiver’s. In this case, A simulates the sender returning the two triplets to the receiver. I chooses a random
bit a′. If the receiver asks to open his triplet, I returns answers consistent with the sender encoding a′ on the
receiver’s triplet. I continues the simulation until step (24), when the receiver sends the bit b′. Since I knows σ ,
given b′ I can compute the unique value, b, that is consistent with the input of an honest receiver using the same




3−PCWOT ) and receives ab. I
then simulates the sender responding with ab ⊕ a′ to the receiver in stage (30). The simulation then continues
until itA halts.
Case 2Ď: Of the triplets created by the sender, at most two are good and returned by A at step (3). Let j be the index of a
bad (or missing) triplet (if there is more than one I chooses randomly between them). The simulation continues
depending on whether I can cheat successfully:
Case 2.1: I received both b0 and b1 (this occurs with probability 13 ). In this case, I chooses i = j. I then continues the
protocol simulating anhonest sender and letting the ideal receiver outputwhatever theA commands it to output.
Case 2.2: I cannot cheat successfully. In this case, I chooses i randomly from {1, 2, 3} \ {j}. This forces A to send the
simulated sender the location of triplet j at step (5). Nomatterwhat he sends the real sender running the protocol
in the ‘‘real-world’’ scenario would abort. Hence, I always aborts at step (6).
Lemma 10.1. For any environment machine Z, and any real adversaryA that corrupts only the receiver, the output of Z when
communicating with A in the real world is identically distributed to the output of Z when communicating with I in the ideal
world.
Proof. The proof is by case analysis. I’s decision tree implicitly groups all possible adversaries by their actions at critical
points in the protocol. To show thatZ’s view of the protocol is identically distributed in the real and idealworlds, it is enough
to show that the distribution of the view is identical given any specific choice byZ andA. Since I’s actions are identical for
all adversaries in the same group, it is enough to consider the groups implied by I’s decision tree.
Case 1.1 This is the case whereA returned triplets that were all good, but sent incorrect locations for the sender’s triplets.
Z’s view in this case consists only of Receiptmessages, the index i that is chosen at random both in the real world and
in the ideal world, and the⊥message sent by the sender.
Case 1.2 This is the case whereA returned triplets that were all good, but asked for triplet i instead of his own triplets. Z’s
view up to step (10) consists of the Receiptmessages, the index i, the permutation pi1. All these are chosen identically in
both the real and ideal worlds. In the real world, with probability 13 the sender would have chosen pi2 that is inconsistent
with A’s guess `2, in which case the protocol would halt with the sender outputting ⊥. In the ideal world, I can cheat
with probability 13 , sowith the same probability the protocol halts and the sender outputs⊥. Conditioned on the protocol
not halting, the view in both cases is also identically distributed, because in the ideal world I cheated successfully and
can simulate the real sender exactly (since it now knows a0 and a1).
Case 1.3 This is the case where the adversary follows the protocol exactly (as far as messages sent to the sender and the
F (IWL) functionality). In this case, I also simulates an honest sender exactly until step (13). In the real and ideal worlds,
the bit encoded on Bob’s triplet (a′) is uniformly random. The response sent in stage (30) is in both cases completely
determined (in the same way) by a′, the input bits a0, a1 and the receiver’s actions.
Case 2 This is the case where the adversary opened (or replaced) containers before returning them in stage (3). The view
up to this stage in both the real and ideal world consists of Receiptmessages and the ids of the opened containers (the
contents are always 1 bits). In both the real and ideal worlds, the index i sent by the sender is uniformly distributed in
{1, 2, 3} (in the ideal world this is because the probability that I cheats successfully is 13 , so that with probability 13 , i
is set to some fixed j, and with probability 23 it is set to one of the other values). Also, in both worlds, the probability
that the sender picked an index which was opened (replaced) by A is determined by the number of containers that
were opened (and is at least 13 ). In either case, I can exactly simulate the sender, since if cheating was unsuccessful the
protocol will necessarily halt before I needs to use the sender’s inputs. Thus, in both cases the protocol will be identically
distributed. 
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10.2. A corrupts the sender





then runs the simulation until the simulated sender sends nine containers. I simulates the receiver returning the containers
to the sender (note that the steps in the protocol now refer to Protocol 5.1b). The simulation now depends onA’s actions:
Case 1Ď: A asks to open one of the containers before sending i to the receiver in step (6). Denote the index of the container
A opens by j. I continues the simulation based on the response to the CanCheat command:
Case 1.1: I can cheat. In this case, I pretends A opened one of the sender’s containers (chosen randomly); I selects a
random permutation σ ∈ S6 from the set of permutations that map one of the sender’s containers to index j. I
then continues the simulation to the end, as if the receiver was honest and had shuffled the containers using σ .





waits for the real (ideal dummy) receiver to send the Choice command. I then continues the simulation using
the real receiver’s bit. After the sender sends the bit in step (22), I calculates the simulated receiver’s output and




3−PCWOT ) using that bit.
Case 1.2: I cannot cheat. In this case, I selects a random permutation σ ∈ S6 from the set of permutations that map one of
the receiver’s containers to index j. I then continues the simulation as if the receiver had shuffled the containers
using σ . No matter what A does, I will then abort at step (9), (13) or (17), since that is what the real receiver
would have done.
Case 2Ď: A does not open any container before sending i in stage (6). The simulation continues until stage (9) or until A
asks to open a container that should not be opened according to the protocol:
Case 2.1Ď: A does not open any container (except those called for by the protocol, whichwill always beA’s own containers)
until the beginning of stage (9). Note that in this case w.l.o.g., A can wait to open containers until step (11). I
continues the simulation, randomly choosing σ at stage (10). The simulation can now take the following paths:
Case 2.1.1Ď: A does not open any container until step (12). By this stage the sender no longer holds any containers, soA
cannot open containers later either. I continues the simulation using 0 in place of the receiver’s choice bit.
Since I knows what exchangesAmade on each of the triplets, at the end of the protocol it can recover both





Case 2.1.2Ď: A opens one of the containers before step (12).
Case 2.1.2.1: I can cheat. In this case, I pretends the container A opens belongs to the sender’s triplet. I sends a




3−PCWOT ) and waits for the real receiver to send the Choice command. I then
continues the simulation using the real receiver’s bit. After the corrupt sender sends the bit in stage (22),




3−PCWOT ) using that bit.
Case 2.1.2.2: I cannot cheat. In this case, I pretends the container A opens belongs to the receiver’s triplet. Whatever
A does, I will then abort in step (13) or (17).
Case 2.2Ď: A asks to open a container not called for by the protocol before stage (9). Denote the index of this container by
j. I’s actions depend on whether it can cheat:
Case 2.2.1: I can cheat. In this case, I selects a random permutation σ ∈ S6 from the set of permutations that map one of
the sender’s containers to index j. I then continues the simulation to the end as if the receiver was honest and
had shuffled the containers using σ . If the simulation reaches step (11) without anyone aborting, I sends a




3−PCWOT ) and waits for the real receiver to send a Choicemessage. I continues the
simulation using the real receiver’s bit. At the end of the simulation, I knows the simulated receiver’s output





Case 2.2.2: I cannot cheat. In this case, I selects a random permutation σ ∈ S6 from the set of permutations that map
one of the receiver’s containers to index j. I then continues the simulation as if the receiver had shuffled the
containers using σ . If an opened container is sent to the receiver in step (8), Iwill then abort at stage (9), since
that is what the real receiver would have done. If the opened container is not sent to the receiver at step (8),
I will abort at step (13) or (17).
Lemma 10.2. For any environment machine Z, and any real adversary A that corrupts only the sender, the output of Z when
communicating with A in the real world is identically distributed to the output of Z when communicating with I in the ideal
world.
Proof. The proof is by case analysis. I’s decision tree implicitly groups all possible adversaries by their actions at critical
points in the protocol. To show thatZ’s view of the protocol is identically distributed in the real and idealworlds, it is enough
to show that the distribution of the view is identical given any specific choice byZ andA. Since I’s actions are identical for
all adversaries in the same group, it is enough to consider the groups implied by I’s decision tree.
Case 1 This is the case where A first deviates from the protocol by opening one of the containers before sending i in
step (6). In the real world, the receiver’s choice of σ is uniformly random. Thus, no matter what container A chooses
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to open, it will be one of the receiver’s containers with probability 12 . In the ideal world, I’s choice of σ is also random:
with probability 12 , I can cheat, in which case σ is chosen from the half of S6 permutations that map j to the sender’s
containers. With probability 12 , I cannot cheat, in which case σ is chosen from the half of S6 permutations that map j to
the receiver’s containers. The rest of the simulation in the ideal world is an exact simulation of the real receiver (in the
case that I cannot cheat, it will never need to use the sender’s input bits, since it will halt in step (9), (13) or (17). Thus
in both cases the protocol view is identically distributed.
Case 2.1.1 This is the casewhereA honestly follows the protocol (from the point of view of I). In this case, up to stage (12), I
simulates a real receiver exactly. The only difference between the simulation and the real world is that I uses the choice
bit 0 in the simulation rather than the receiver’s input bit. However, the view ofA is identical, since in both cases the bit
requested by the receiver in stage (12) is uniformly random (because σ is chosen at random, andA has no information
about the order of the final two triplets). The receiver’s output is identical in both worlds, because I can compute the
sender’s inputs fromA’s actions.
Case 2.1.2 This is the case where A first deviates from the protocol by opening a container during step (11). Up to the
deviation from the protocol, I simulates the real receiver exactly, so the protocol view up to that point is identical in
both worlds. In both worlds,A has no information about the order of the two remaining triplets (this is determined by
the choice of σ and i). In the real world, the containerA opens will be the receiver’s container with probability 12 . In the
ideal world, this will also be the case, since I can cheat with probability 12 . If I can cheat, the rest of the simulation exactly
follows the protocol (since I now knows the real receiver’s choice bit). If I cannot cheat, the choice of σ ensures that the
rest of the simulation still follows the protocol exactly, since the receiver will abort before it needs to use its choice bit.
Thus, in both worlds the protocol view is identically distributed.
Case 2.2 This is the casewhereA first deviates from the protocol by opening a container after sending i in step (6) but before
stage (9). As in Case 1 (and for the same reasons), σ is uniformly distributed in both worlds. If I can cheat, the simulation
follows the protocol exactly (I knows the real receiver’s choice), so the view is identical. If I cannot cheat the choice of
σ ensures that I will never have to use the real receiver’s choice, so the view is again distributed identically to the real
world. 
Together, Lemmas 10.1 and 10.2 prove Theorem 5.1.
11. Discussion and open problems
11.1. Zero knowledge without bit commitment
In the bare model, where BC is impossible, Zero-knowledge proofs exist only for languages in SZK — which is known to
be closed under complement and is thus unlikely contain NP. An interesting open question is whether the class of languages
that have zero-knowledge proofs in the DWL model (where BC is impossible; see Section 3.3) is strictly greater than SZK
(assuming P 6= NP).
11.2. Actual human feasibility
Theprotocolswedescribe in this article canbeperformedbyunaidedhumans, however, they require toomany containers
to be practical for most uses. It would be useful to construct protocols that can be performed with a smaller number of
containers (while retaining security), and with a smaller number of rounds.
Another point worth mentioning is that the protocols we construct in the distinguishable models only require one of the
parties to seal and verify containers. Thus, the binding property is only used in one direction, and the tamper-evidence and
hiding properties in the other. This property is useful when we want to implement the protocols in a setting where one of
the parties may be powerful enough to open the seal undetectably. This may occur, for instance, in the context of voting,
where one of the parties could be ‘‘the government’’ while the other is a private citizen.
In both theweakly and strongly fair CF protocols, only the first round requires envelopes to be created, and their contents
do not depend on communication with the other party. This allows the protocols to be implemented using scratch-off cards
(which must be printed in advance). In particular, the weakly fair CF protocol can be implemented with a scratch-off card
using only a small number of areas to be scratched.
In the case of BC, our protocol requires the powerful party to be the receiver. It would be interesting to construct a BC
protocol for which the powerful party is the sender (i.e., only the sender is required to to seal and verify envelopes).
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